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I. CASEY EMERSON AND THE MODERN CONTROVERSY
"Title to the land in Montana should have gone to the state as soon as
Montana became a state in 1889. And the only real question is: Does the
federal government owe us rent on that land since then?"
- Former State Senator Casey Emerson
1
1. Telephone Interview with Clarence A. Emerson, former Montana State Senator, R-
Bozeman (Apr. 29, 2004).
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A. Introduction2
Clarence A. ("Casey") Emerson of Bozeman, Montana-a former
state senator, retired high school teacher, and now a prominent local
businessman-wants Montana to sue the federal government. 3 Montana,
like most other western states, is composed largely of federal land, 4 and
2. The following is a list of repeatedly referenced works:
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (Merrill Jen-
sen et al. eds., 1976-2004) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY] (multiple vols. projected;
not all completed).
JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (Burt Franklin ed., 1968) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S
DEBATES].
THE FEDERALIST (Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, James Madison) (George W. Carey et al.
eds., Gideon 2001).
SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Times Books 1979) [here-
inafter JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY].
FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM (1985).
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) (1911)
[hereinafter Farrand].
I RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1999).
Peter A. Appel, The Power of Congress "Without Limitation ": The Property Clause and
Federal Regulation of Private Property, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2001).
Albert W. Brodie, A Question of Enumerated Powers: Constitutional Issues Surrounding
Federal Ownership of the Public Lands, 12 PAC. L.J. 693 (1981).
David E. Engdahl, State and Federal Power over Federal Property, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 283
(1976).
Eugene R. Gaetke, Refuting the "Classic" Property Clause Theory, 63 N.C. L. REV. 617
(1985).
Robert E. Hardwicke et al., The Constitution and the Continental Shelf, 26 TEX. L. REV.
398 (1948).
Carolyn M. Landever, Whose Home on the Range? Equal Footing, the New Federalism
and State Jurisdiction on Public Lands, 47 FLA. L. REV. 557 (1995).
Robert G. Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 55
CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter Natelson, Necessary and Proper].
Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077 (2004)
[hereinafter Natelson, Public Trust].
Robert G. Natelson, The Enumerated Powers of States, 3 NEV. L.J. 469 (2003) [hereinafter
Natelson, Enumerated],
Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay in Origi-
nal Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Natelson, General Welfare].
Robert G. Natelson, A Reminder: The Constitutional Values of Sympathy and Independ-
ence, 91 KY. L.J. 353 (2003) [hereinafter Natelson, Sympathy and Independence].
C. Perry Patterson, The Relation of the Federal Government to the Territories and the
States in Landholding, 28 TEX. L. REV. 43 (1949).
3. Telephone Interview with Clarence A. Emerson, supra note 1.
4. Federal land makes up the following percentages of the areas of the Rocky Mountain
states:
A rizona ............................................................................................. 44 .7%
C olorado ........................................................................................... 36.3%
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Emerson, like many other Westerners, is fed up with federal land man-
agement. He wants that acreage given to the states. More specifically,
he wants Montana's federal lands deeded to the state government. Mon-
tanans, he says, can do a lot better managing local lands than bureaucrats
in Washington, D.C.-who, if they care about Montana at all, are under
enormous pressure from people who do not.
Casey Emerson is not a lawyer, but he is pretty sure he has a clear
case. The Constitution, he says, limits federal land ownership within ex-
isting states to post offices and post roads, the capital district, and items
enumerated in the Enclave Clause: "Forts, Magazines, Arsenals,
dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings." 5  He argues that the other
relevant constitutional provision, the Property Clause, 6 contemplates
only land disposal and land management pending disposal.
Even if the chances of success are not high, Emerson sees this as a
case worth bringing. He believes Montanans cannot continue to suffer
under federal land ownership policies. Those policies, he says, throw
people out of work and bar them from their own backyards. In past
years, he continues, federal policies have fostered over-cutting of timber;
more recently, they have fostered undercutting-resulting in ravenous
and polluting forest fires. He adds that the federal government harbors
on its lands dangerous predators, such as wolves and grizzly bears that
wander onto private property and threaten people and livestock.7 Local
people, he says, would administer Montana lands far more responsibly.
Idah o ................................................................................................ 62 2 %
Montana........................... 27.8%
N ew M exico ..................................................................................... 34.1%
N evada ............................................................................................. 89 .5%
U tah .................................................................................................. 64 .2%
W yom ing ......................................................................................... 49.8%
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 228 tbl.369 (117th ed. 1997).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 17:
The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases
whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession
of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Gov-
ernment of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places pur-
chased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for
the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Build-
ings.
6. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2:
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regu-
lations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and
nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the
United States, or of any particular State.
7. Telephone Interview with Clarence A. Emerson, supra note 1.
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B. Prior Legal Commentaries
Emerson's position-that the Constitution, as originally understood,
requires the federal government to transfer nearly all of its remaining
land to the states-may not reflect current case law, 8 but it is not unique.
Indeed, after reviewing parts of the historical record, several legal com-
mentators have reached conclusions more radical than Emerson's. Those
commentators argue that all permanent federal landholding within states
and outside the Enclave Clause violates the true meaning of the Constitu-
tion, and that such lands should be ceded to the respective state govern-
ments.9 This conclusion-I shall call it the "conservative" position-is
challenged by "liberal" commentators who argue that the Management
Power in the Property Clause (to "make all needful Rules and Regula-
tions respecting" federal land) authorizes virtually unlimited federal au-
thority to own acreage.' 0 At times, the exchange among commentators
has been heated, with conservatives referring to federal land ownership
as "national socialism"11 and liberals characterizing their opponents as
"extremists."12
Unfortunately, commentators on neither side have done a particu-
larly good job of uncovering the original meaning of the Property Clause.
Prior studies have, for the most part, focused on historical material only
weakly probative of the original meaning. For example, several conser-
vative commentaries 13 and one major liberal commentary 14 emphasize
the terms of state grants of territories to Congress during the Confedera-
tion period. However, the scope of congressional property powers under
8. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (granting broad management,
and presumably retention, authority under the Property Clause); 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra
note 2, at 390-93.
9. See e.g., Brodie, supra note 2; Hardwicke, supra note 2; Patterson, supra note 2. See
also Landever, supra note 2 (showing some sympathy for this view).
10. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. However, as pointed out by one of the more recent
liberal commentators, heretofore the liberals have paid less attention to history than have the
conservatives. See Appel, supra note 2, at 7-8.
11. Patterson, supra note 2, at 56 (calling views supporting extensive federal landowning
"national socialism").
12. E.g., Appel, supra note 2, at 11-12 (calling most advocates of a narrow Property
Clause interpretation "extremists"). See also George Cameron Coggins et al., The Law of Pub-
lic Rangeland Management I. The Extent and Distribution of Federal Power, 12 ENVTL. L.
535, 567 (1982) (labeling contentions that federal property ownership is constitutional only
under the Enclave Clause as "extreme states-rights arguments").
13. E.g., Brodie, supra note 2, at 695-96; Patterson, supra note 2, at 48-50.
14. Gaetke, supra note 2, uses the language of cessions in contending that Congress was
granted broad discretionary power to keep the lands, but his argument is not very convincing.
Id. at 626-67 (inferring a right to retain from a wording change from "granted and disposed
of" to "disposed of' and from the Northwest Ordinance's language preventing state interfer-
ence with disposal).
2005]
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the Confederation was very different from that under the Constitution, 1 5
because the Articles of Confederation conferred no express landowning
authority and foreclosed reliance on implied authority. 16 These com-
mentaries fail to explain convincingly why the negotiated terms of state
grants of lands east of the Mississippi under the Articles should govern
treaty cessions west of the Mississippi under the Constitution. 17 A favor-
ite resort of conservative commentators has been the Equal Footing Doc-
trine. 18 Yet the Equal Footing Doctrine, while found in the Northwest
Ordinance, 19 is unmentioned in the Constitution and thus is rarely a fac-
tor in constitutional adjudication. 20
Commentators on both sides have analyzed the notes of the federal
constitutional convention: a more germane source, to be sure, but a
scanty one, for those notes have little to say about the relevant portions
of the Property Clause.21 Commentators' heaviest reliance has been on
Supreme Court decisions issued many years-sometimes many dec-
ades-after the Constitution was ratified.22 Such cases declare the doc-
trine for their times, but are not very good measures of original meaning.
They are the products of special pleading, crafted largely from the briefs
of parties and of amici curiae who had little motivation or expertise for
dispassionate historical investigation. Moreover, nearly all these cases
were decided before important records from the founding era became
commonly available. 23
15. See Gaetke, supra note 2, at 629.
16. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II. "Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom,
and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation
expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled." Id. (emphasis added).
17. The terms of these grants do, however, add some context to statements made in the
ratification debates. See infra Part IV.C.4.
18. See e.g., Brodie, supra note 2, at 705-06. For a fairly recent treatment, see Landever,
supra note 2.
19. NORTHWEST ORDINANCE art. 5, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/
nworder.htm (last visited June 2, 2004) ("And, whenever any of the said States shall have sixty
thousand free inhabitants therein, such State shall be admitted, by its delegates, into the Con-
gress of the United States, on an equal footing with the original States in all respects what-
ever .... ).
20. Cf Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
21. Discussion at the federal convention centered more on the Enclave Clause, 2 Farrand,
supra note 2, at 117, 127-28, 261, 321-22, 325, 505, 509, and on the provisions of the Prop-
erty Clause relating to the admission of new states and integrity of state boundaries, 2 id. at
133, 136, 147, 153, 173, 188, 324, 457, 458, 459, 461-65.
22. See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 2, at 293-300 (discussing nineteenth century cases);
Gaetke, supra note 2, passim (devoting most of its attention to nineteenth and twentieth cen-
tury cases).
23. For example, Max Farrand's sprawling collection of convention materials, Farrand,
supra note 2, was not published until the early twentieth century, well after some of the critical
Property Clause cases discussed by the commentators. E.g., Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 212 (1845); Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885). For an example
[Vol. 76
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The upshot of all this is that there never has been a satisfactory
analysis of whether the Property Clause, as originally understood, per-
mitted widespread retention of federal land within state boundaries. The
purpose of this Article is to provide such an analysis, and to do so by re-
focusing attention on the materials and factors most pertinent to recon-
structing the provision's original meaning.
C. The Approach of This Study
1. The Nature of Original Meaning
Scholars across the political spectrum 24 agree that for purposes of
constitutional interpretation, the legally relevant issue regarding a par-
ticular clause of the Constitution is not the "original intent" of the draft-
ers, but the clause's objective meaning to the ratifying public. 25 The
principle is closely analogous to that applied in contract law: if the sub-
jective intent of an offeror is not reflected in the offer and is different
from the probable understanding of the offeree, then generally that intent
of a commentator discussing these and other nineteenth century cases, see Gaetke, supra note
2, at 640-57.
James Hutson's valuable supplement did not see the light of day until 1987. SUPPLEMENT
TO MAX FARRAND'S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (James H. Hutson
ed., 1987) [hereinafter Hutson, SUPPLEMENT]. The first volume of DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 2, was issued in 1976. The first of four volumes dealing with New York was not
issued until 2003, and the set is still far from complete. 19 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 2. John Dickinson's notes of the constitutional convention were not published until 1983.
See James H. Hutson, John Dickinson at the Federal Constitutional Convention, 40 WM. &
MARY Q. 256 (1983). Those notes contain the prototype of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
Hutson, SUPPLEMENT, supra, at 86, 89 (authorizing Congress "to pass Acts" to effectuate its
enumerated powers), and have other constitutional implications. See, e.g., Natelson, General
Welfare, supra note 2, at 26 (helping to explain the public trust purposes of the General Wel-
fare Clause).
Also, as a practical matter many documents have become readily available to commenta-
tors in the hinterlands (such as this author) only with the advent of the Internet. See, e.g., Con-
stitution Society, Welcome to the Constitution Society, at http://www.constitution.org (last vis-
ited Jan. 20, 2005).
For additional discussion of "original meaning," and distinctions between it and "original
intent" and "original understanding," see Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The In-
terpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113 (2003).
24. See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 8-9, 17-18 (1996); Randy E. Bar-
nett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183,
187 (2003); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REv. 611
(1999). Professor Rakove leans toward "progressive" views while Professor Barnett leans to-
ward "libertarian" views.
25. I have entitled this article "Original Understanding" rather than "Original Meaning,"
however, because it explores the contemporaneous public understanding as valuable evidence
of original meaning.
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is not part of the ensuing contract.2 6 This contractual approach reflects
reality in that the Constitution (as amended by the Bill of Rights), was in
fact a political bargain among contending factions.
2. Evidence of Original Meaning
Some kinds of evidence of original meaning are more reliable than
others. Among the least reliable is the sort that prior Property Clause
commentators have leaned on most heavily: post-ratification material;
that is, material generated by events that, at the time of ratification, were
still in the future. I resort to such material very sparingly, and only when
it is uncontradicted, merely confirmatory of better evidence, or an admis-
sion against interest. I have, however, placed some leading post-
ratification cases in the footnotes to show the extent to which subsequent
adjudication reflects or contradicts the original meaning.
The most dependable evidence of original meaning, of course, is the
structure and wording of the Constitution, read in the context of eight-
eenth century usage and definitions. Although in its fundamentals eight-
eenth century English was the same language we use today, there were
many subtle differences, and those differences can deceive. One trying
to deduce original meaning, therefore, should possess a good eighteenth
century dictionary, 2 7 a working knowledge of Latin,2 8 and (for interpre-
tation of legal terms) access to contemporaneous legal materials. 29
26. Cf E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.6 (1982) (objective theory of contracts
generally prevails).
27. The most celebrated is, of course, JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY, supra note 2.
28. Latin was an essential part of the education of virtually every schooled person in the
founding generation. For this reason, and also because that generation was closer to the time
when Latin was commonly spoken, the founders' English usage was influenced heavily by the
older tongue. See MCDONALD, supra note 2, passim; GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA:
JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 93 (Vintage Books 1979). To be blunt about
it, I do not think one can be a competent constitutional interpreter without a fair knowledge of
Latin.
To illustrate the point: I sometimes ask my students the meaning of the phrase in the Pre-
amble, "a more perfect Union." Those with no Latin invariably answer, "a better union." The
answer is "a more complete union." In the eighteenth century, outside the religious context,
the word "perfect" nearly always meant "complete," following the Latin verb perficere, to fin-
ish or complete. JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY, supra note 2. Similarly, knowledge of Latin makes
all the difference in understanding the original meaning of "provide" in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 1, the Taxation Clause. See Natelson, General Welfare, supra note 2, at 15-16.
29. Probably the single most useful legal source is WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES. Others include the works of Edward Coke, reported English cases, and the
Emperor Justinian's codification of Roman law, from which English and American courts bor-
rowed freely. Perhaps the most famous example of such borrowing is that classic chestnut of
the law school curriculum, Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. Cas. 175 (N.Y. 1805) (the venerable "fox
hunting" case that traditionally begins courses in basic property law).
[Vol. 76
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Next in evidentiary value are the records of the ratification debates,
both within and outside of the state ratifying conventions. The words
and actions of delegates at the federal constitutional convention also are
valuable, because they shed light on the meaning of the document to the
ratifiers.
Another essential interpretative tool is a basic knowledge of the
founders' educational and cultural background, heavily imbued with
(mostly) Protestant Christianity, the "Whig" version of English and colo-
nial history, and the history and literature of ancient Greece and Rome.
30
Finally, competent constitutional interpretation requires an under-
standing of the broadly held constitutional values Americans were trying
to implement when they drafted, promoted, ratified, amended---or op-
posed-the Constitution.
30. Perhaps the best book on the cultural influences on the framers is MCDONALD, supra
note 2. An example of the cultural mix mentioned in the text is John Adams' Novanglus,
which praised the "revolution principles" of "Aristotle and Plato, of Livy and Cicero, and Sid-
ney, Harrington, and Locke." JOHN ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS OF JOHN
ADAMS 152 (C. Bradley Thompson ed., 2000). Similarly, Hamilton's notes for his famous
June 18, 1787 convention speech contain the following reference: "Aristotle-Cicero-
Montesquieu-Neckar." I Farrand, supra note 2, at 308. See also J. C. FURNAS, THE
AMERICANS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1587-1914 267-74 (1969) (tracing
classical influence primarily through the architectural styles of the founding generation).
On the pervasive influence of Greco-Roman classics on the founding generation, see gen-
erally CARL J. RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND THE CLASSICS: GREECE, ROME, AND THE
AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT (1994). Professor Richard tells us:
After the Stamp Act of 1765, many theses applied the political principles of Aris-
totle, Cicero, and Polybius to the debates concerning independence and the Consti-
tution. Samuel Adams had anticipated these issues in his own master's thesis, de-
livered in flawless Latin in 1743. In answer to the title question "Whether It Be
Lawful to Resist the Supreme Magistrate, if the Commonwealth Cannot Be Other-
wise Preserved," Adams resoundingly asserted: absolutely!
Id. at 24.
A more subtle example of how Latin stylists such as Cicero influenced the debates appears
in the essays of the anti-federalist "Impartial Examiner." For example, he introduced his sub-
ject from the standpoint of a foreigner looking in-the same device adopted by Cicero in his
oration Pro Caelio. The Impartial Examiner's lengthy fourth sentence distinctly echoes the
first in the Pro Caelio. 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 387-88. Shortly thereaf-
ter, the writer imagines the foreigner disapprovingly thinking of Americans as "seeking after
new things." 8 id. at 388. Res novae (new things) is the Latin term for revolution, and has a
negative connotation. CHARLTON T. LEWIS, A LATIN DICTIONARY 1220 (photo. Reprint 1980)
(1879).
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3. The Interpretative Value of "Constitutional Values" 31
Justice Stephen Breyer once pointed out that the "general purposes"
behind the Constitution-that is, the values underlying it-should assist
courts in construing the document. 32 He observed that when we interpret
any other legal document, we employ its underlying goals as an aid to
understanding it. We should do the same with the Constitution. 33
The members of the founding generation, federalists and anti-
federalists alike, were surprisingly unanimous in the political values they
were trying to promote. They all wanted a charter that would realize
those values, even if they disagreed on whether the federal convention's
draft would suffice. 34
Some of the founders' core values are still understood and appreci-
ated today. One example is republicanism-the idea of popular govern-
ment conducted under the rule of law.35 Other values are understood, if
not always appreciated. An example is decentralization-achieved in
the Constitution by limiting the central government's jurisdiction to a
circumscribed cluster of enumerated powers.36 Still other values tend to
be overlooked today, even by constitutional scholars. Three of these are
particularly relevant to interpreting the federal government's property
powers.37
The first of the neglected three was the ideal of fiduciary govern-
ment. Virtually without dissent, participants in the American founding
thought of public officials as guardians, agents, servants, or trustees of
the people. The founders' ideas on this subject had been borrowed from
seventeenth and eighteenth century English Opposition theorists38 such
3 1. In discussing these values, I rely on some of my earlier work, collected supra note 2.
I see no need to extend the current article by restating the underlying evidence here.
32. Stephen Breyer, Madison Lecture: Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
245, 247-48 (2002) ("[The Constitution's] handful of general purposes will inform judicial
interpretation of many individual provisions that do not refer directly to the general objective
in question.").
33. Id. at 249.
34. See generally Natelson, Sympathy and Independence, supra note 2.
35. Robert G. Natelson, A Republic, Not a Democracy? Initiative, Referendum, and the
Constitution 's Guarantee Clause, 80 TEX. L. REV. 807 (2002) (collecting citations on the
founders' republicanism).
36. Natelson, Enumerated, supra note 2, at 472.
37. There were other widely-held values in the founding, but I limit my discussion here to
those of particular importance to the property powers. Some of the others were theism, private
property, and personal liberty.
38. For authors other than those listed here, see generally Natelson, Public Trust, supra
note 2.
[Vol. 76
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as John Locke, 39 who in turn had appropriated them from classical au-
thors such as Cicero.40 This "strong" public trust doctrine was far more
encompassing than the similarly named doctrine we encounter today in
natural resource and water law.4 1 Under the founders' version, govern-
ment officials had a universal responsibility to act pursuant to norms
analogous to those imposed on private sector guardians, agents, servants,
and trustees.42 Officials were to act with care and loyalty, in good faith,
within their instructions, for the general good, and impartially. 43 If, for
example, a legislative body passed a law that benefited some citizens at
disproportionate expense to others, that legislative body violated its duty
of impartiality.44  Governmental breaches of trust-at least serious
39. E.g., JOHN LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT: SECOND TREATISE (1690), available at
http://www.constitution.org/jl/2ndtreat.htm (last visited June 2, 2004). See id. at 18 ("nor un-
der the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but what that legislative shall enact ac-
cording to the trust put in it"); id. at 110 ("to the legislative, acting pursuant to their trust"); id.
at 113-14 ("the community put the legislative power into such hands as they think fit, with this
trust, that they shall be governed by declared laws, or else their peace, quiet, and property, will
still be at the same uncertainty as it was in the state of nature"); id. at 116-17 ("But govern-
ment, into whosesoever hands it is put, being, as I have before shown, entrusted with this con-
dition, and for this end, that men might have and secure their properties"); id. at 129 ("The
power of assembling and dismissing the legislative, placed in the executive, gives not the ex-
ecutive a superiority over it, but is a fiduciary trust placed in him, for the safety of the peo-
ple .... "); id. passim.
40. E.g., I MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE OFFICIIS 85 (Walter Miller trans., Loeb
1956).
41. One branch of this modem "public trust doctrine" is that the state holds lands sub-
merged beneath navigable waterways in public trust. The leading case is Illinois Central Rail-
road Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). Another branch is the rule, applied in some states,
that some or all natural resources are held in public trust. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-
15 (2000):
Declaration of policy. It is hereby found and declared that there is a public trust in
the air, water and other natural resources of the state of Connecticut and that each
person is entitled to the protection, preservation and enhancement of the same. It is
further found and declared that it is in the public interest to provide all persons with
an adequate remedy to protect the air, water and other natural resources from unrea-
sonable pollution, impairment or destruction.
For short surveys of the doctrine and citation to the literature, see Joseph L. Sax, The Pub-
lic Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV.
471 (1970) and James R. Rasband, Book Review, The Public Trust Doctrine, A Tragedy of the
Common Law, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1335 (1999) (reviewing BONNIE J. MCCAY, OYSTER WARS
AND THE PUBLIC TRUST: PROPERTY, LAW, AND ECOLOGY IN NEW JERSEY HISTORY (1998)).
Some commentators have argued that the delegates at the federal convention rejected the
trust theory as to the public lands. E.g., Gaetke, supra note 2, at 634-35, 638. In fact, how-
ever, they sought to implement a trust theory far more profound and sweeping. See generally
Natelson, Public Trust, supra note 2, at 1136-68.
42. Natelson, Public Trust, supra note 2.
43. Id.
44. The duty of impartiality is manifested throughout the Constitution, notably in the
General Welfare Clause. See Natelson, General Welfare, supra note 2, at 49-54; Natelson,
Public Trust, supra note 2, passim and at 1150-58.
HeinOnline  -- 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 337 2005
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
ones-were ultra vires.45 In the language of the Constitution, they were
not "proper." 46 They were therefore void.47
A second core value relevant to understanding the federal govern-
ment's property functions was the ideal of "fellow-feeling" 48 or, as it
usually was called, "sympathy." 49 The social aspects of sympathy had
been a prominent feature of Adam Smith's influential philosophical
work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments. 50 The founders applied sympa-
thy to political systems. The ideal of sympathy was that there be identity
of interest, rather than conflict of interest, between governors and gov-
45. For example, the liberal British minister and influential political commentator Rich-
ard Price had written, "[Parliaments] possess no power beyond the limits of the trust for the
execution of which they were formed. If they contradict this trust, they betray their constitu-
ents and dissolve themselves." RiCHARD PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF CIVIL
LIBERTY, THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE JUSTICE AND POLICY OF THE WAR
WITH AMERICA 11 (1776), available at http://www.constitution.org/price/price.txt (last visited
Jan. 20, 2005). Cf JOHN LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT: SECOND TREATISE 106 (1690),
available at http://www.constitution.org/jt/2ndtreat.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2005): "[T]he
power of the society, or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend far-
ther than the common good, but is obliged to secure every one's property by providing against
those three defects above mentioned that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy."
John Dickinson expressed similar sentiments. See Robert G. Natelson, The Constitutional
Contributions of John Dickinson, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 415, 437 (2003). See also James
Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments (1785), http://
press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendlreligions43.html (last visited Jan. 20,
2005):
Because if Religion be exempt from the authority of the Society at large, still less
can it be subject to that of the Legislative Body. The latter are but the creatures and
vicegerents of the former. Their jurisdiction is both derivative and limited: it is lim-
ited with regard to the co-ordinate departments, more necessarily is it limited with
regard to the constituents. The preservation of a free Government requires not
merely, that the metes and bounds which separate each department of power be in-
variably maintained; but more especially that neither of them be suffered to overleap
the great Barrier which defends the rights of the people. The Rulers who are guilty
of such an encroachment, exceed the commission from which they derive their au-
thority, and are Tyrants.
See also 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 501 (discussing James Madison, who, at the
Virginia ratifying convention, stated that even the British king was not empowered to "dis-
member the empire").
46. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 18 (the Necessary and Proper Clause).
47. Natelson, Necessary and Proper, supra note 2, at - (forthcoming 2005).
48. See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 395 (James Madison, using this term
at the Virginia ratifying convention); 3 id. at 590 (Patrick Henry, doing the same, at the same
convention).
49. The only detailed treatment of the concept in the constitutional context is Natelson,
Sympathy and Independence, supra note 2, at 358-82, on which this discussion relies.
50. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 9-16 (D. D. Raphael & A. L.
Macfie eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1776). For the book's international reception, see the editors'
introduction, id. at 25-32.
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emed.51 Preferably, each government official should feel this identity of
interest not merely with some faction but with the public as a whole, or
at least with all his own constituents. Accordingly, James Madison pro-
posed a President who would "be considered as a national officer, acting
for and equally sympathizing [sic] with every part of the U. States." 52
Virtually every participant who addressed the issue agreed that constitu-
tions should be written to promote sympathy. 53 Obviously, a govern-
ment sympathetic to all the people was more likely to honor its public
trust than one that was not.
A third founding value germane to interpreting the federal govern-
ment's property powers was the value of independence. Ideally, republi-
can decision makers should be free from the sort of "undue influence"
(note the fiduciary law 54 usage) that might deflect them from following
fiduciary standards. 55 The discretion of dependent people was liable to
be clouded by those on whom they were dependent. "In Religion the
Creature is apt to forget its Creator," observed Gouverneur Morris at the
federal convention. "[I]t is otherwise in political affairs." 56
The drafters of the Constitution left to the states the task of limiting
the electorate to the self-supporting, independent voters on whom gov-
ernmental units and officials were to depend.57 However, those drafters
51. For the founders' view that public officials had a fiduciary obligation to serve the
general welfare and not specific interest groups or "factions," see generally Natelson, Public
Trust, supra note 2.
52. 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 80. Cf 3 ELLIOT, supra note 2, at 488 (James Monroe,
stating at the Virginia ratifying convention: "He ought to depend on the people of America for
his appointment and continuance in office; he ought also to be responsible, in an equal degree,
to all the states ....").
53. See Natelson, Sympathy and Independence, supra note 2, at 358-82 (quoting both
federalists and anti-federalists).
54. The phrase "undue influence" was a staple in political analysis. See, e.g., 8
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 440 (Alexander White); 9 id. at 679 ("A Native of
Virginia"); Letters from George Washington to the Marquis de Lafayette (Apr. 28 & May 1,
1788, in 9 id. at 767; 14 id. at 338 (Oliver Ellsworth, writing as "A Landholder"); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 7 (John Jay), supra note 2, at 7; THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander Hamil-
ton), supra note 2, at 396, 399.
55. Natelson, Sympathy and Independence, supra note 2, at 382-415; see also 10
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 1577 ("Impartial Examiner," stating that undue
influence leads to partiality).
56. 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 512. Cf THE FEDERALIST NO. 79 (Alexander Hamilton),
supra note 2, at 408 ("In the general course of human nature, a power over a man's subsis-
tence amounts to a power over his will."). John Adams wrote in 1776 that "children, servants
and the propertyless were excluded [from civic life] because they were 'too little acquainted
with public affairs to form a right judgment, and too dependent upon other men to have a will
of their own."' MCDONALD, supra note 2, at 161. Cf 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 124 (Madi-
son opining on the "biassed [sic] directions of a dependent Judge").
57. On the perceived need for voters to be independent, see Natelson, Sympathy and In-
dependence, supra note 2, at 386-90.
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spent much effort crafting a structure in which governmental units and
officials could act independently of other units and officials. The goal
was a structure in which official judgments were unclouded by the undue
influence of other governmental actors. Furthermore, assuring that gov-
ernmental actors were independent of each other (and thus dependent
only on the people) enabled them to compete freely against each other
for popular favor.58
In pursuit of the ideal of independence, the drafters sought to render
federal decision makers relatively free of the states and vice versa. They
made the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the federal gov-
ernment largely independent of each other. 59 The few times they vio-
lated the principle of independence (as when they authorized state legis-
lators to elect federal senators), it was mostly to concede to units closer
to the people the ability to influence those farther away. 60 But these
were exceptions to the general rule.
Incidentally, the principal of independence should not be confused
with the doctrine of separation of powers. The latter was merely a tool to
be employed--or laid aside-as the needs of independence dictated.
61
As I understand it, Justice Breyer's point about underlying values
("general purposes") is this: when confronted with more than one possi-
ble interpretation of a constitutional provision, we should select the one
that more nearly comports with the values the Constitution was designed
to implement. Of course, this interpretative principle is of less utility
when no core values are in play or the relevant ones conflict. We shall
see, however, that this is not so with the Property Clause: the underlying
values of fiduciary government, sympathy, and independence are very
helpful in divining its meaning.
II. BETSY JOHNSON AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RATIFICATION PROCESS
Just as the twenty-first century viewpoint of Casey Emerson helps
us frame current controversies over federal land ownership, so can the
eighteenth century perspective of Mrs. Elizabeth ("Betsy") Johnson as-
sist us in understanding the meaning of the Property Clause at ratifica-
tion. Unlike Mr. Emerson, Betsy Johnson and her husband, Edmund, are
fictional characters. However, they are highly representative amalgama-
tions of the politically-involved "moderates" who had to be won over be-
58. Id. at 404-05.
59. Id.at399-401.
60. Id. at 406-07.
61. Id. at401.
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fore the Constitution could be ratified.62 By looking through Betsy
Johnson's eyes, we can see how the proposed Constitution was under-
stood by intelligent and active participants in the ratification debate.
We meet Mrs. Johnson in the early spring of 1788, when she was
thirty-four years old. She and Edmund were living in a state that had not
yet ratified the Constitution. They resided not far from the state capital
with their four surviving children, the youngest of whom was ten years
old.
Mrs. Johnson was respected locally as, in eighteenth century dialect,
a "woman of parts": of intelligence and talent. Edmund was a reasona-
bly successful businessman. The family enjoyed an upper middle class
lifestyle.
Like Betsy, Edmund was well regarded by his neighbors. They
showed this by electing him as a delegate to the pending state ratifying
convention. Most of his neighbors were mildly anti-federalist, but they
decided not to instruct him how to vote, and to trust in his discretion.6 3
Yet Edmund was not, as he sometimes said, "of a theoretick Turn of
Mind." His wife was the political enthusiast in the family. Because her
children were no longer small and because the family could now afford a
few servants, she had time to read about and discuss political affairs with
her friends, neighbors, and the local officeholders. In deciding how to
cast his vote, Edmund would find Betsy's advice highly persuasive.
From reading the newspapers, Betsy knew that two years earlier the
Annapolis Convention had asked the Confederation Congress to call a
convention to revise the Articles of Confederation. 64 On February 21,
1787, Congress complied. Convention delegates assembled in Philadel-
phia on May 14, achieved a quorum on May 25, and finished their work
62. Constitutional interpretation has suffered, I think, from an overemphasis on the views
of characters who took staunch nationalist positions: men like Alexander Hamilton, Gou-
verneur Morris, and James Madison. While the opinions of those personalities, especially
Madison, are very important, just as much--often greater-insight comes from studying the
views of more skeptical participants. It was, after all, the men in the middle who had to be
won over, and without whom there would have been neither ratification nor a bill of rights.
Edmund Randolph was one such person. Other influential contemporaries within the great
moderate middle (on a spectrum from leaning nationalist to leaning confederate) were John
Dickinson, Elbridge Gerry, Richard Henry Lee, and George Mason.
63. This scenario was not uncommon. It was precisely the situation of William Symmes,
Jr., a delegate to the Massachusetts ratifying convention. Symmes, a lawyer, was elected as an
uninstructed delegate from a moderately anti-federalist district, delivered a speech at the con-
vention expressing doubts about the Constitution, and after being reassured by the adoption of
amendments, supported ratification. See 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 244-45.
Symmes's elaborate speeches can be found at 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 70-75,
172-74. He was only twenty-eight years old.
64. The chronology used here is in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at xl- xlii.
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on September 17.65 Their proceedings were secret. Thus, Betsy did not
know that during the early weeks of the convention, the delegates
seemed determined to adopt a very strong national government (modeled
after the Virginia Plan), but then thought the better of it as time wore
on.66 Eventually they proposed a government with a very different struc-
ture from Congress under the Articles, and with modest accessions of
power, defined and enumerated in the document. 67 Betsy did know that
the federal convention had transmitted its final draft to Congress, which
on September 28 had sent it to the states for ratification. Ratification was
to be effectuated by individual state conventions, 68 such as the one to
which Mr. Johnson had been chosen as a delegate.
Through the newspapers, Betsy learned that by early January, 1788,
conventions in five states (Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Geor-
gia, and Connecticut) already had ratified by substantial margins. By
that time, though, the anti-federalist opposition was stiffening, and it had
become clear that the Constitution's advocates would have to make con-
cessions to win the approval of most of the remaining states. In particu-
lar, the public needed reassurance that the jurisdiction of the new gov-
ernment would be sharply circumscribed.
Betsy Johnson was convinced that reform of the Articles of Confed-
eration was necessary. Yet she was glad that the federalist momentum
had slowed, for much about the new Constitution disquieted her. The
document was so "high-toned, ' '69 in the phrase of the day. It seemed so
little regardful of the states and of people's local concerns. The drafters
were, insofar as she knew of them, men she much respected, especially
Dr. Franklin and General Washington. Yet she also knew that the conse-
quences of ratification would survive any person then living. 70
65. 13 id.
66. Natelson, Enumerated, supra note 2, at 472-73.
67. Id. at 473.
68. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
69. For contemporary examples of variants of the phrase "high-toned" to describe gov-
ernment relatively distant from the people, see 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 366 (Alexander
Hamilton); 1 id. at 464 (James Madison); Letter from Nicholas Gilman to Joseph Gilman (July
31, 1787), in 3 id. at 66; Daniel Carroll, Notes and Correspondence, in 3 id. at 320 ("At that
moment the Cant expression was high toned Government which superceeded [sic] the usual
descriptions of Monarchy, Aristocracy, or Democracy.").
70. The importance of ratification or non-ratification to the future course of mankind was
much discussed during the public debates. See, e.g., 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
2, at 502 ("M.C." writing, "The present is universally acknowledged to be a most momentous
aera [sic], as likely to decide the fate of a world for future ages."); 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 2, at 10 (Fisher Ames, speaking at the Massachusetts ratifying convention); 2 id. at 120-
21 (General William Health, speaking at the Massachusetts ratifying convention); 2 id. at 419
(James Wilson, speaking at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention); 3 id. at 271 (George Ma-
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In early 1788, Mrs. Johnson began to read and hear things she found
reassuring. Respected federalists such as James Madison 71 and James
Wilson 72 publicly emphasized the new government's sharply limited
scope. Other federalists published lists exemplifying the vast govern-
mental functions outside the federal sphere that were to remain with the
states and the people. 73 One of the list-makers was the prolific Tench
Coxe, a businessman who wrote under several pseudonyms, but most of
the others were celebrated lawyers. 74 Federalists also began to agree,
sometimes reluctantly, to various amendments-the embryo of the Bill
of Rights-further restricting national influence over individuals and
states.
On the basis of these federalist concessions, states continued to rat-
ify, but in every state except Maryland 75 prospective amendments were
part of the basis of the bargain.76 Conventions in Massachusetts, Vir-
ginia, New York, and New Hampshire approved the Constitution only by
narrow margins, even after winning over some anti-federalists by offi-
son, speaking at the Virginia ratifying convention); THE FEDERALIST No. I (Alexander Hamil-
ton), supra note 2, at 1.
71. Madison wrote:
The powers delegated by the proposed constitution to the federal government,
are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the state governments, are nu-
merous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects,
as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of
taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several
states will extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern
the lives, liberties, and properties of the people; and the internal order, improve-
ment, and prosperity of the state.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison), supra note 2, at 241.
72. Wilson said:
I leave it to every gentleman to say whether the [enumerated] powers are not as ac-
curately and minutely defined, as can be well done on the same subject, in the same
language.... nor does it, in any degree, go beyond the particular enumeration; for,
when it is said that Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be nec-
essary and proper, those words are limited and defined by the following, "for carry-
ing into execution the foregoing powers." It is saying no more than that the powers
we have already particularly given, shall be effectually carried into execution.
2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 468 (Wilson, speaking at Pennsylvania ratifying con-
vention).
73. Natelson, Enumerated, supra note 2, at 479-88.
74. Id. at 479-80.
75. 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at xli. The vote for ratification in Mary-
land was lopsided: 63-11. 13 id.
76. An extant letter from Madison to Hamilton offers a glimpse into the bartering proc-
ess. Letter from James Madison to Alexander Hamilton (June 22, 1788), in 10 id. at 1665
(discussing the plan of the federalists to concede recommendatory amendments so as to secure
ratification in Virginia).
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cially proposing amendments. 77 South Carolina approved by a wider
margin, but also proposed amendments. 78 Two states-North Carolina
and Rhode Island-flatly refused to consent until Congress had sent
amendments to the states for approval. 79
All around her, Betsy Johnson witnessed, and sometimes partici-
pated in, a public debate of great vigor. It surfaced in personal ex-
changes and raged in convention elections, in orations and pamphlets, in
the newspapers, in state legislatures, and in the ratifying conventions.80
Thus was shaped the great democratic political bargain that established
the American form of government.
III. KINDS OF FEDERAL PROPERTY: ENCLAVES, TERRITORIES, AND
"OTHER PROPERTY"
A. The General Scheme
During the eighteenth century, reading was a more leisurely and
thoughtful enterprise than it usually is today. Local newspapers had re-
printed the proposed Constitution, and Betsy and Edmund Johnson pe-
rused it on several successive evenings before the hearth. They had an
interest in the clauses pertaining to federal land ownership; several of
their friends had title to land in the Northwest Territory, and other friends
77. The Constitution was approved in Massachusetts by a vote of 187-168, in Virginia by
89-79, in New York by 30-27, and in New Hampshire by 57-47. 13 id. at xli-xlii.
78. The vote in South Carolina was 149-73. 13 id. at xlii.
79. 13 id. at xlii.
80. There is much historical testimony to the ubiquity of the debate. To cite just a hand-
ful of examples: A few weeks after the federal convention adjourned, Virginia's St. George
Tucker reported to his wife, "The Topic of the day is the new Constitution." Letter from St.
George Tucker to Frances Bland Tucker (Oct. 3, 1787), in 8 id. at 35. On October 21, 1787,
James Madison, then in New York, wrote to Edmund Randolph that already, "The Newspapers
in the middle & Northern States begin to teem with controversial publications." Letter from
James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Oct. 21, 1787), in 13 id. at 429. A week later, George
Lee Turberville wrote to Arthur Lee, "The plan of a Government proposed to us by the Con-
vention-affords matter for conversation to every rank of beings from the Governor to the
door keeper-& the opinions appear to be as various as the persons possessing them ......
Letter from George Lee Turberville to Arthur Lee (Oct. 28, 1787), in 8 id. at 127. See also
Letter from James Breckinridge to John Breckinridge (Oct. 31, 1787), in 8 id. at 136; Letter
from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 9, 1787), in 8 id. at 226 ("The Constitution
proposed by the late Convention engrosses almost the whole political attention of America.");
Letter from James McClurg to James Madison (Oct. 31, 1787), in 8 id. at 137. After eleven
states had ratified, Francis Hopkinson wrote that "Since the World began, I believe no Ques-
tion has ever been more repeatedly & strictly scrutenized [sic] or more fairly & freely argued,
than this proposed Constitution .... Letter from Francis Hopkinson to Thomas Jefferson
(July 17, 1788), in 18 id. at 270.
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held continental securities, which they expected to be redeemed, if at all,
from congressional sale of western lands. 81 In addition, the Johnsons'
eldest son was talking about joining the Continental Army. His parents
realized how difficult his job might be if Congress did not obtain effec-
tive power to acquire, fund, and maintain western military installations.82
The Johnsons noticed that the Constitution distributed federal lands
into three classes. The first was "territory," so labeled in the Property
Clause. 83 Territory was the land lying outside the boundaries of all
states, ceded to Congress by Britain and by individual states, and extend-
ing north from the Ohio River and west to the Mississippi River.84 The
Johnsons knew that later acquisitions of "territory" were possible, be-
cause Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia might be persuaded to cede
southwestern lands to Congress. 85 Many Americans hoped the United
States eventually would annex Canada and all or parts of Florida and
Louisiana. 86 The Johnsons recognized that if the Constitution were
adopted and the federal government acquired more territory, the Man-
agement Power in the Property Clause would give Congress the capacity
to "make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting" it.87
The Constitution's second class of federal land ownership was au-
thorized by what is now called the Enclave Clause: in Article I, Section
8, Clause 17.88 I will examine the Enclave Clause in the next subpart
because its content, structure, and history shed light on our primary
topic: the third class of federal land, called by the Constitution "other
Property." 89
81. See infra Part IV.C.4.
82. See infra Part IV.C.4.
83. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
84. MCDONALD, supra note 2, at 95.
85. Id. at 95, 168.
86. The Articles of Confederation had contemplated the annexation of land to the United
States. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XI ("Canada acceding to this confederation, and
joining in the measures of the United States, shall be admitted into, and entitled to all the ad-
vantages of this Union: but no other colony shall be admitted into the same, unless such ad-
mission be agreed to by nine States."). See also 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 189
(quoting Oliver Ellsworth, who at the Connecticut ratifying convention, argued that failure to
ratify would encourage Spain not "to relinquish the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi, or
the territory which she claims on the east side of that river"); 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 457-
59, 461-66 (Gouvemeur Morris writing that at the time of the federal convention he had hoped
the United States would acquire Canada and Louisiana).
87. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. It sometimes is asserted that "territory" in this clause
referred only to then existing territories. E.g., Hardwicke, supra note 2, at 423. I have seen no
evidence of this. On the modem law, see 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 2, at 386.
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
89. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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B. Enclave Property
The Johnsons learned from the Constitution and from columns in
newspapers9 ° and pamphlets91 that the new government was to be one of
only enumerated powers.92 It was to have no jurisdiction beyond that
granted in the instrument. Most enumerated powers were listed in Arti-
cle I, Section 8, although some others, such as authority to make trea-
ties9 3 and dispose of land,94 lay elsewhere in the document. The Enclave
Clause was the second-to-last power in Article I, Section 8. It authorized
Congress
[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such
District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of par-
ticular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of
the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority
over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the
State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Maga-
zines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings .... 95
Thus, federal enclaves, unlike territories, were to be located within
particular states. Enclaves were to be subject to the general legislative
authority of Congress. The phrase "exclusive Legislation" implied that
state laws had no force within federal enclaves, 96 although a very few
90. See, e.g., I Farrand, supra note 2, at 464 (James Madison).
91. E.g., Noah Webster, To the Dissenting Members of the Late Convention of Pennsyl-
vania, in FRIENDS OF THE CONSTITUTION: WRITINGS OF THE "OTHER" FEDERALISTS: 1787-
1788 176 (Colleen A. Sheehan & Gary L. McDowell eds., 1998) (writing as "America").
92. M'Cullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) ("This government is
acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers.") (Marshall, C.J.).
93. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("He [the President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators pre-
sent concur .... ).
94. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any
Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.").
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
96. See also 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 419 (John Marshall, stating at the
Virginia ratifying convention, "The power of legislating given them within the ten miles
square is exclusive of the states, because it is expressed to be exclusive."); 3 id. at 434 (Wil-
liam Grayson, making a similar point at the same convention); THE FEDERALIST NO. 32
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 2, at 155 (stating that the capital district will be governed
only by federal law).
Early in its history the Supreme Court adopted this rule for the District of Columbia.
Reily v. Lamar, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 344 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.). See also United States v. Cor-
nell, 25 F. Cas. 650 (C.C.R.I. 1820) (Story, J.) (applying the same rule to a fort under U.S. ju-
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thought that state legislation would survive to the extent it was not super-
seded by federal law. 97
Betsy Johnson noticed that to be eligible for ownership under the
Enclave Clause, "Buildings" had to be "needful." The adjective "need-
ful" was a much more familiar word for her than it is for us today. It was
a common synonym for "necessary." 98 Both words had several mean-
ings, and they changed meanings together. In some circumstances, "nec-
essary" or "needful" could mean "indispensable." 99 At the opposite ex-
treme, when they were used in phrases such as "as he shall judge
needful," and "whenever [they] shall deem it necessary," they meant that
the decision maker could do practically anything he or she wanted. 100
What did "needful" mean in this case?
The answer came from an unexpected direction. Mrs. Johnson had
heard of the public dispute over the Necessary and Proper Clause, 101 one
of the most controversial of the enumerated powers given to Congress.
That clause had disturbed her, because at first glance it seemed to be a
vague and limitless font of congressional power. The anti-federalists
were representing it as such.102
risdiction). But see Engdahl, supra note 2, at 288-89 (arguing that "exclusive legislation"
means only the power to legislate with preemptive effect).
97. See 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 435 (George Nicholas, speaking at the
Virginia ratifying convention). Engdahl, supra note 2, at 289, cites THE FEDERALIST No. 43
(James Madison) for this proposition, but this seems to be a misreading. Madison apparently
was referring to a future municipal govermment--"a municipal legislature for local pur-
poses"--for the capital district, not the government of the ceding state. THE FEDERALIST NO.
43 (James Madison), supra note 2, at 223.
The Supreme Court has adopted the "legal co-existence" principle for some enclaves.
Evans v. Conman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); Howard v. Comm'rs. of Sinking Fund of the City of
Louisville, 344 U.S. 624 (1953).
98. M'Cullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 356 (1819) ("'Necessary and
proper' are, then, equivalent to needful and adapted."); Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the
Constitutionality of the National Bank, in M. ST. CLAIR CLARK & D.A. HALL, LEGISLATIVE
AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 97 (Augustus M. Kelley
ed., 1967) (1832); JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY, supra note 2 (giving the definition of "needful" as
"Necessary; indispensably requisite" and the first definition of "necessary" as "Needful, indis-
pensably requisite").
99. JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY, supra note 2 (defining both "needful" and "necessary" as,
sometimes "indispensably requisite"). Cf U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3
(both using "necessary" in a procedural context as "indispensable"). For other examples, see
Natelson, Necessary and Proper, supra note 2.
100. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. See also id. art. V ("shall deem it necessary").
101. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("The Congress shall have Power... [tjo make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Depart-
ment or Officer thereof.").
102. 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 846 ("The Republican Federalist," call-
ing it the "omnipotent clause"); 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 150 (quoting Patrick
Henry, who called it the "sweeping clause" at the Virginia ratifying convention). For one of
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Then, one day, the Johnsons were conducting some business with
their family lawyer. That worthy gentleman gave them several docu-
ments to sign, one of which was a power of attorney appointing an agent
for Edmund's retailing business. Betsy noticed that the power of attor-
ney included wording very reminiscent of the Necessary and Proper
Clause. 1 0 3 She asked her lawyer if the similarity was intentional, and he
assured her that it almost certainly was. He reminded her that many of
the Constitution's drafters were distinguished lawyers, including some
who had received their training in the finest institutions in Britain. 10 4
The Necessary and Proper Clause made it clear that the Constitution in-
corporated an established principle of agency law known as the doctrine
of implied incidental powers. 10 5 The clause reflected the view that in the
new government Congress would be the agent of the people. 106
many newspaper attacks on it, see 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 120 (referring
to it as "Brutus").
103. Readers who doubt that in the eighteenth century a woman might be called upon to
sign such an instrument should examine Howard v. Bailie, 126 Eng. Rep. 737, 741 (K.B.
1796) (involving a woman as principal in a power of attorney granting "necessary or proper"
power to her business agents).
104. The Necessary and Proper Clause was drafted by four of the country's leading attor-
neys: Edmund Randolph, Oliver Ellsworth, James Wilson, and John Rutledge. Natelson, Nec-
essary and Proper, supra note 2. Wilson had studied at St. Andrews University in Scotland
and trained in the law office of John Dickinson. CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND
CONVENTION 104-05 (1966). The "finest institutions in Britain" referred to in the text were
the Inns of Court, where seven other delegates had been trained. See E. ALFRED JONES,
AMERICAN MEMBERS OF THE INNS OF COURT 21-22, 61-63, 102, 104-05, 134-35, 170-72
(1924) (discussing John Blair, John Dickinson, William Houston, Jared Ingersoll, William
Livingston, Charles Pinckney, and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney). Inns of Court alumni also
served as leaders of the federalist faction during the ratification process. See id. at 124-25
(Henry Lee, a federalist speaker at the Virginia ratifying convention); id. at 216-17 (Alexander
White, author of one of the published enumerations of state powers and a leading federalist
spokesman in Virginia); 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 525 (Francis Corbin,
leading federalist spokesman at the Virginia ratifying convention).
105. See generally Natelson, Necessary and Proper, supra note 2.
106. See, e.g., 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 260 (James Wilson, referring to federal officials
as the agents of the people). Many others in the founding generation made explicit their view
of free government as an agency arrangement. See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2,
at 306 (James Madison, at the Virginia ratifying convention, stating: "The members of the one
government, as well as of the other, are the agents of, and subordinate to, the people."); 3 id. at
225 (John Marshall, speaking at the Virginia ratifying convention: "You cannot exercise the
powers of government personally yourselves. You must trust to agents."); 3 id. at 227 ("We
are answered, that the powers may be abused; that... Congress may... prostitute their pow-
ers to destroy our liberties. This goes to the destruction of all confidence in agents."); 3 id. at
233 ("Are they not both the servants of the people? Are not Congress and the state legislatures
the agents of the people, and are they not to consult the good of the people?"); 2 Farrand, su-
pra note 2, at 377 ("Mr. Elsworth argued that they were unnecessary. The U- S- heretofore
entered into Engagements [i.e., debts] by Congs who were their Agents. They will hereafter
be bound to fulfil [sic] them by their new agents."); THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison),
supra note 2, at 63 (Congress to be the people's "representatives and agents"); THE
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The Johnsons' lawyer added that the implied incidental powers doc-
trine had been refined through two centuries of English case law. "You
need to know, therefore," he said, "that when you sign this document
giving your agent 'needful and necessary' 107 powers to carry on a gen-
eral retailing business, he must stay within the scope of his mandate-he
must limit himself to accomplishing your goals. But by these words you
give him more than just the powers absolutely or reasonably necessary to
accomplish those goals. You also give him considerable discretion to
use means that are customary or even convenient to accomplish your
purpose. 108 If you want to restrict your agent's discretion more nar-
rowly, you will have to specify in the document that you are giving only
absolutely necessary powers."10 9
He added that he was less certain about the meaning of the term
"proper" in the Necessary and Proper Clause, but it was a common word
in agency usage. To be proper, any law Congress adopted had to meet
fiduciary standards inherent in the agency relationship. 1 0 In other
words, to be "proper" a law had to comply with the rules in the Constitu-
tion, treat citizens relatively impartially, and represent a good faith effort
to effectuate an enumerated power. It could not be a mere pretext to
regulate something else. 111
Mrs. Johnson later read a federalist tract explaining the Necessary
and Proper Clause as, essentially, surplusage-a mere rule of interpreta-
FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison), supra note 2, at 243 ("The federal and State govern-
ments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people .... ); THE FEDERALIST No.
78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 2, at 404 ("If there should happen to be an irreconcilable
variance between the two... the constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention
of the people to the intention of their agents.").
107. An example of elegant variation: Cf SCOTT J. BURNAM, DRAFTING AND ANALYZING
CONTRACTS 227 (3d ed. 2003) (referring to this poor drafting practice). However, this word-
ing was common in eighteenth century powers of attorney. See, e.g., ANONYMOUS, THE
ATrORNEY'S COMPLEAT POCKET-BOOK 174 (3d ed. 1751) ("to do, execute and accomplish,
all and whatsoever shall be needful and necessary to be done in or about the Premisses [sic]");
id. at 174-75 ("to execute, seal and deliver such Conveyances and Assurances of the said Pre-
misses [sic] ... as shall be needful and requisite for the doing thereof... granting unto my
said Attorney full Power and absolute Authority to do, execute and perform any Act or Acts,
Thing or Things whatsoever, that shall be needful and necessary to be done"). The "Pocket-
Book" was what we would call a form book today, presenting common legal forms for com-
mon transactions.
108. See Natelson, Necessary and Proper, supra note 2. Cf M'Cullough v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat) at 413 ("If reference be had to its use, in the common affairs of the world, or in
approved authors, we find that it frequently imports no more than that one thing is convenient,
or useful, or essential to another.").
109. Cf U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 (requiring use of the phrase "absolutely necessary"
in the policy context).
110. Natelson, Necessary and Proper, supra note 2.
111. Id.
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tion, without which federal authority would remain unchanged. 112 The
clause was surplusage, it seemed, because the grant of express powers
implicitly authorized any "necessary" means, and because "improper"
actions were ultra vires breaches of trust even without the clause. 113
Mrs. Johnson found this somewhat reassuring, but still thought it would
be a good idea to add some clarifying amendments. 114
So when Mrs. Johnson reread the Enclave Clause, she saw that
"needful" meant the same thing as "necessary" in the Necessary and
Proper Clause; indeed, it had replaced "necessary" in an earlier draft. 115
To qualify as a federal enclave, a building had to be necessary, custom-
ary, or convenient for executing an enumerated power-not merely need-
ful in the abstract. This was confirmed by the examples of "needful
Buildings" listed in the Constitution: "Forts, Magazines, Arsenals,
dock-Yards." It also was confirmed by the federalist essays she had read
listing governmental powers outside the federal domain. 116 These essays
had pointed out that buildings for purposes outside the enumerated pow-
ers, such as schools and poorhouses, would not be within the domain of
Congress. 1 17
The drafters had inserted the Enclave Clause to better effectuate the
fiduciary ideal of impartiality. 118 They wanted federal installations to be
112. E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 44 (James Madison).
113. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
114. The Ninth and Tenth Amendments were added for that purpose. Natelson, Necessary
and Proper, supra note 2. Governor Edmund Randolph of Virginia was central to adoption of
these amendments as clarifying the Necessary and Proper Clause. Id.
115. 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 321, 325. Madison apparently made the initial proposal. 2
id. at 324-25.
116. See Natelson, Enumerated, supra note 2.
117. 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 652 (Massachusetts Gazette article, rep-
resenting that charity schools and poorhouses were outside the federal sphere); 5 id. at 568
(Justice Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant, representing that schools and institutions for the poor
were outside the federal sphere).
118. On July 26, 1787, at the Constitutional Convention, George Mason proposed the idea
of a federal capital district:
Col. Mason. observed that it would be proper, as he thought, that some provision
should be made in the Constitution agst. choosing for the seat of the Genl. Govt. the
City or place at which the seat of any State Govt. might be fixt. There were 2 objec-
tions agst. having them at the same place, which without mentioning others, re-
quired some precaution on the subject. The 1st. was that it tended to produce dis-
putes concerning jurisdiction-The 2d. & principal one was that the intermixture of
the two Legislatures tended to give a provincial tincture to ye Nati. deliberations.
He moved that the Come. be instructed to receive a clause to prevent the seat of the
Nati. Govt. being <in the same City or town with> the seat of <the Govt. of> any
State <longer> than untill [sic] the necessary public buildings could be erected.
2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 127. The motion was seconded and the idea discussed for a time
and then deferred. 2 id. at 127-28.
On August 11, James Madison set forth the following rational for a capital district:
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independent of the states in which they were located. Various historical
examples compelled this conclusion, but the most recent had befallen
only four years before the convention, when in June, 1783, mutinous sol-
diers, angry because they had not been paid, besieged Congress in the
State House in Philadelphia. 119 Without its own police force, Congress
had to ask the Pennsylvania executive council to call out the state mili-
tia. 120 To Congress' mortification, the council refused. Although the
soldiers refrained from molesting any of its members, Congress never-
theless felt compelled to leave the state and convened for several weeks
at Princeton, New Jersey. This incident led Congressman Benjamin
Hawkins to move "[tihat a Committee be appointed to consider and de-
fine the jurisdiction proper to be established by Congress within the
bounds of the district that may be allotted to them by the State in which
they may chose [sic] to fix their permanent residence." 121 Congress au-
thorized creation of the committee, which subsequently recommended a
Mr. <Madison> supposed that a central place for the Seat of Govt. was so just and
wd. be so much insisted on by the H. of Representatives, that though a law should
<be made requisite for> the purpose, it could & would be attained. The necessity of
a central residence of the Govt wd be much greater under the new than old Govt
The members of the <new> Govt wd. be more numerous. They would be taken
more from the interior parts of the States: they wd. not, like members of <ye pre-
sent> Congs. come so often from the distant States by water. As the powers & ob-
jects of the new Govt. would be far greater <yn. heretofore>, more private individu-
als wd. have business calling them to the seat of it, and it was more necessary that
the Govt should be in that position from which it could contemplate with the most
equal eye, and sympathize most equally with, every part of the nation.
2 id. at 261 (emphasis added).
On August 18, the predecessor of the Enclave Clause was proposed. 2 id. at 321-22. See
also 2 id. at 364 (referral to committee of detail on August 18). It was polished and presented
by the Brearly Committee of Eleven on September 5, 2 id. at 505-06, then amended and
adopted. 2 id. at 510.
119. The story is told concisely in WILLIAM GARROTT BROWN, THE LIFE OF OLIVER
ELLSWORTH 102-03 (1905).
120. 24 J. CONTINENTAL CONG. 410 (1783), available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(jcO24158)). The petition read in part:
Resolved, That the president and supreme executive council of Pensylvania, be in-
formed that the authority of the United States having been this day grossly insulted
by the disorderly and menacing appearance of a body of armed soldiers about the
place within which Congress were assembled, and the peace of this city being en-
dangered by the mutinous disposition of the said troops now in the barracks, it is, in
the opinion of Congress, necessary that effectual measures be immediately taken for
supporting the public authority.
24 id.
121. 24 id. at 428, available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/
hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(jc024164)).
20051
HeinOnline  -- 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 351 2005
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
capital district between three and six miles square, subject to exclusive
federal jurisdiction. 122
Although the Confederation Congress did not get its capital district,
the drafters of the Constitution were determined that the federal authority
never again would find itself at the mercy of the policymakers of any
state. Hence the insertion of the Enclave Clause.
During the subsequent ratification debates, a few anti-federalists
denied that the Enclave Clause was necessary, 123 but most participants
who spoke to the issue124-including some anti-federalists 125-
122. 25 id. at 603-04, available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/
nhlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(jc02517)).
123. See, e.g., Letter from Caleb Wallace to William Fleming (May 3, 1788), in 9
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 782-83; 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 146
(Patrick Henry, at the Virginia ratifying convention, stating that Holland, "the fairest country
in the world" got along well without a Ten Miles Square). Governor Edmund Randolph re-
sponded to Henry:
Holland [Randolph means the entire United Provinces of the Netherlands], it seems,
has no ten miles square. But she has the Hague, where the deputies of the states as-
semble. It has been found necessary to have a fixed place of meeting. But the in-
fluence which it has given the province of Holland [one of the seven provinces] to
have the seat of the government within its territory, subject in some respects to its
control, has been injurious to the other provinces. The wisdom of the Convention is
therefore manifest in granting the Congress exclusive jurisdiction over the place of
their session.
3 id. at 190.
124. See, e.g., 4 id. at 219-20 (James Iredell, speaking at the North Carolina ratifying con-
vention). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison), supra note 2, at 222-23:
The indispensable necessity of complete authority at the seat of government,
carries its own evidence with it. It is a power exercised by every legislature of the
union, I might say of the world, by virtue of its general supremacy. Without it, not
only the public authority might be insulted, and its proceedings be interrupted with
impunity, but a dependence of the members of the general government on the state
comprehending the seat of the government, for protection in the exercise of their
duty, might bring on the national councils an imputation of awe or influence,
equally dishonorable to the government and dissatisfactory to the other members of
the confederacy. This consideration has the more weight, as the gradual accumula-
tion of public improvements at the stationary residence of the government, would be
both too great a public pledge to be left in the hands of a single state, and would
create so many obstacles to a removal of the government, as still further to abridge
its necessary independence.
The necessity of a like authority over forts, magazines, &c. established by the
general government, is not less evident. The public money expended on such
places, and the public property deposited in them, require, that they should be ex-
empt from the authority of the particular state. Nor would it be proper for the places
on which the security of the entire union may depend, to be in any degree dependent
on a particular member of it. All objections and scruples are here also obviated, by
requiring the concurrence of the states concerned in every such establishment.
In further support came the following from the Massachusetts ratifying convention:
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recognized the need to shield important federal installations from insult,
intimidation, or undue influence from the states where those installations
were located.
The anti-federalists' principal complaint about the Enclave Clause
was that it might be abused. They agreed with the goal of official impar-
tiality, but argued that the new government might employ the Enclave
Clause to defeat that goal. At the Virginia ratifying convention, for ex-
ample, William Grayson predicted that Congress might grant monopolies
and other special privileges to companies in the capital district and other
federal enclaves. 126  Anti-federalists such as New York's Gilbert
Hon. Mr. STRONG said, every gentleman must think that the erection of a
federal town was necessary, wherein Congress might remain protected from insult.
A few years ago, said the honorable gentleman, Congress had to remove, because
they were not protected by the authority of the state in which they were then sitting.
He asked whether this Convention, though convened for but a short period, did not
think it was necessary that they should have power to protect themselves from in-
sult; much more so must they think it necessary to provide for Congress, consider-
ing they are to be a permanent body.
Hon. Mr. DAVIS (of Boston) said it was necessary that Congress should have
a permanent residence; and that it was the intention of Congress, under the Confed-
eration, to erect a federal town. He asked, Would Massachusetts, or any other state,
wish to give to New York, or the state in which Congress shall sit, the power to in-
fluence the proceedings of that body, which was to act for the benefit of the whole,
by leaving them liable to the outrage of the citizens of such states?
2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 99; see also 3 id. at 433 (James Madison, speaking at
the Virginia ratifying convention):
How could the general government be guarded from the undue influence of particu-
lar states, or from insults, without such exclusive power? If it were at the pleasure
of a particular state to control the session and deliberations of Congress, would they
be secure from insults, or the influence of such state? If this commonwealth de-
pended, for the freedom of deliberation, on the laws of any state where it might be
necessary to sit, would it not be liable to attacks of that nature (and with more in-
dignity) which have been already offered to Congress?
See also 3 id. at 439-40 (Edmund Pendleton, speaking at the same convention).
125. See, e.g., 3 id. at 291 (William Grayson, speaking at the Virginia ratifying conven-
tion); 3 id. at 432 (George Mason, who had proposed enclaves at the federal convention,
speaking at the Virginia ratifying convention). But see 3 id. at 434 (Grayson, at the same con-
vention, suggesting that Congressional jurisdiction over the capital district should not be ex-
clusive).
126. 3 id. at 291:
Perhaps I am mistaken, but it occurs to me that Congress may give exclusive privi-
leges to merchants residing within the ten miles square, and that the same exclusive
power of legislation will enable them to grant similar privileges to merchants in the
strongholds within the states .... [I]n process of time, and from the simple operation
of effects from causes, the whole commerce of the United States may be exclusively
carried on by merchants residing within the seat of government, and those places of
arms which may be purchased of the state legislatures.... Things of a similar nature
have happened in other countries; or else from whence have issued the Hanse
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Livingston and Virginia's Patrick Henry and George Mason feared that
residents of the "Ten Miles Square" would consist largely of dependents
of the government who would lose sympathy with the rest of the country
and administer affairs to suit themselves. 127 Anti-federalists further ar-
gued that Congress might use military enclaves to intimidate the states128
Towns, Cinque Ports, and other places in Europe, which have peculiar privileges in
commerce as well as in other matters?
See also 3 id. at 430-31 (same). For the notion that granting monopolies was a breach of trust,
see, for example, Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Oct. 18, 1787), in 13
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 408 (suggesting that granting monopolies would be
a breach of trust and outside Congress's enumerated powers).
127. See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 287-88 (Gilbert Livingston, speaking
at the New York ratifying convention); 3 id. at 158 (Patrick Henry, speaking at the Virginia
ratifying convention); 3 id. at 431 (George Mason, speaking at the same convention); see also
Letter from Caleb Wallace to William Fleming (May 3, 1788), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 782-83, writing that the capital district
will be the most successful nursery of slaves that ever was devised by man .... The
sum of the whole is, that these numerous and wealthy slaves will infallibly be de-
voted to the views of their masters; and having surrendered their own, will always
be ready to trample on the rights of free men .... By these officers, or rather crea-
tures of state, the supreme government will be administered and Congressional pur-
poses accomplished without regard to the State governments or feeling for individu-
als.
9 id.
128. There are numerous surviving examples of anti-federalist concern about the dangers
in the "ten miles square" and the federal military enclaves. E.g., 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 182 ("Cato" declaiming against the "ten miles square"); 2 Farrand, supra note
2, at 510 (Elbridge Gerry, speaking at the federal convention); see also 17 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 46 (Consider Arms, Malachi Maynard & Samuel Field):
When we take a forward view of the proposed Congress, seated in the federal city,
ten miles square, fortified and replenished with all kinds of military stores, and
every implement-with a navy at command on one side, and a land army on the
other. We say, when we view them, thus possessed of the sword in one hand and
the purse-strings of the people in the other, we can see no security left for them in
the enjoyment of their liberties ....
See also 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 62 (Major Kingsley at the Massachusetts rati-
fying convention):
[O]ur federal rulers will be masters, and not servants. I will examine what powers
we have given to our masters. They have power to lay and collect all taxes, duties,
imposts, and excises; raise armies; fit out navies; to establish themselves in a federal
town of ten miles square, equal to four middling townships; erect forts, magazines,
arsenals, &c....
It has been said that there was no such danger here. I will suppose they were
to attempt the experiment, after we have given them all our money, established them
in a federal town, given them the power of coining money and raising a standing
army, and to establish their arbitrary government; what resources have the people
left?
See also 4 id. at 203 (William Lenoir, at the North Carolina ratifying convention, stating:
"They have also an exclusive legislation in their ten miles square, to which may be added their
power over the militia, who may be carried thither and kept there for life. Should any one
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and thereby undermine the independence of state governments from un-
due federal influence.
Feeding anti-federalist fears was the conviction that the enclaves
might be too large. One of the best essayists to oppose the Constitu-
tion-the "Federal Farmer"-noted that ten miles square was four times
the area of London. 129 When Patrick Henry led the opposition to the
Constitution at the Virginia ratifying convention, part of his larger as-
sault on Article I, Section 8 was his claim that
[t]he clause before you gives a power of direct taxation, unbounded
and unlimited, exclusive power of legislation, in all cases whatsoever,
for ten miles square, and over all places purchased for the erection of
forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, &c. What resistance could be
made? The attempt would be madness. You will find all the strength
of this country in the hands of your enemies; their garrisons will natu-
rally be the strongest places in the country. 130
Betsy Johnson noticed that, in addition to justifying the Enclave
Clause's role as a guardian of federal independence, the friends of the
Constitution offered a three-prong defense of that provision. First, they
suggested that the residents of the Ten Miles Square might not be as
wicked at anti-federalists feared. 131 Being a skeptical woman, Mrs.
Johnson did not think much of that argument. She found the federalists'
second point more persuasive: an enclave could not be created without
the consent of the local state legislature, which could impose conditions
to guard state independence. 132 She also was reassured by the propo-
grumble at their acts, he would be deemed a traitor, and perhaps taken up and carried to the
exclusive legislation, and there tried without a jury.").
129. 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 366-68 (the "Federal Farmer," ex-
pressing a concern about a federal district four times the area of London). See also 2 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 2, at 62 (Major Kingsley at the Massachusetts ratifying convention,
complaining that the capital district will be as large as "four middling townships"); 2 id. at 99
("Dr. TAYLOR asked, why it need be ten miles square, and whether one mile square would
not be sufficient.").
130. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 51 (speaking at the Virginia ratifying conven-
tion). See also 3 id. at 56 ("I believe I should take up very little of your time in enumerating
the little power that is left to the government of Virginia; for this power is reduced to little or
nothing: their garrisons, magazines, arsenals, and forts, which will be situated in the strongest
places within the states; their ten miles square, with all the fine ornaments of human life, added
to their powers, and taken from the states, will reduce the power of the latter to nothing.").
131. See, e.g., 3 id. at 124 (Governor Edmund Randolph, speaking at the Virginia ratifying
convention: "Will the ten miles square transform our representatives into brutes and tyrants? I
see no grounds to distrust them."); 3 id. at 435-36 (Henry Lee, making a similar point at the
same convention); 3 id. at 558 (John Marshall, making a similar point at the same convention).
132. On September 5, 1787, the following colloquy took place at the Constitutional Con-
vention, according to Madison's notes:
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nents' third contention: federal enclaves would be quite small. By the
terms of the clause, all but one of the enclaves would consist only of
"Buildings" and, presumably, appurtenant grounds. The largest enclave,
the capital district-"this little spot" 133-was to be limited to ten miles
square and might well be even smaller. 134
On the residue, to wit, "to exercise like authority over all places purchased for forts
&c. Mr Gerry contended that this power might be made use of to enslave any par-
ticular State by buying up its territory, and that the strongholds proposed would be a
means of awing the State into an undue obedience to the Genl. Government-Mr.
King thought himself the provision unnecessary, the power being already involved:
but would move to insert after the word 'purchased' the words 'by the consent of
the Legislature of the State.' This would certainly make the power safe. Mr. Govr
Morris 2ded. the motion, which was agreed to nem. con. as was then the residue of
the clause as amended."
2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 510. The expression "nem. con.," which was used extensively in
the notes of the convention, means "nemine contradicente"-that is, "no one contradicting" or
unanimously. Of course, at the convention this referred to votes of state delegations, not indi-
viduals. See also 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 219-20 (James Iredell, at the North
Carolina ratifying convention, arguing that a state could "stipulate the conditions of the ces-
sion"); THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison), supra note 2, at 289 ("And as it [i.e., an
enclave] is to be appropriated to this use with the consent of the State ceding it: as the State
will no doubt provide in the compact for the rights and the consent of the citizens inhabiting it;
as the inhabitants will find sufficient inducements of interest to become willing parties to the
cession."). Cf 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 89-90 (James Madison, speaking at the
Virginia ratifying convention):
He next objects to the exclusive legislation over the district where the seat of gov-
ernment may be fixed. Would he submit that the representatives of this state should
carry on their deliberations under the control of any other member of the Union? If
any state had the power of legislation over the place where Congress should fix the
general government, this would impair the dignity, and hazard the safety, of Con-
gress. If the safety of the Union were under the control of any particular state,
would not foreign corruption probably prevail, in such a state, to induce it to exert
its controlling influence over the members of the general government? Gentlemen
cannot have forgotten the disgraceful insult which Congress received some years
ago. When we also reflect that the previous cession of particular states is necessary
before Congress can legislate exclusively any where, we must, instead of being
alarmed at this part, heartily approve of it.
See also 3 id. at 433 (James Madison, at the same convention, stating, "there must be a ces-
sion, by particular states, of the district to Congress, and that the states may settle the terms of
the cession. The states may make what stipulation they please in it, and, if they apprehend any
danger, they may refuse it altogether."); 3 id. at 434 (George Nicholas, at the same convention,
making much the same point); 3 id. at 439 (James Madison, making the same point at the same
convention). But cf 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 2, at 387-88 (providing that at time of
cession, state and federal government may agree on a plan of joint sovereignty).
133. 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 674 ("A Native of Virginia").
134. See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 432 (James Madison, at the Virginia
ratifying convention, referring to the capital enclave as "a small district, which cannot exceed
ten miles square, and may not be more than one mile"); id. (James Madison calling it "a very
circumscribed district"); THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison), supra note 2, at 223
("The extent of this federal district is sufficiently circumscribed to satisfy every jealousy of an
opposite nature.").
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A modem Supreme Court opinion helps explain why the framers in-
cluded size limitations as well as the state-consent requirement:
The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the
benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political entities,
or even for the benefit of the public officials governing the States. To
the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and
state governments for the protection of individuals. State sovereignty
is not just an end in itself: "Rather, federalism secures to citizens the
liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power." 135
The framers had decided that no dependent or corrupt state legisla-
ture would be allowed to surrender huge tracts of state territory to Con-
gress and threaten "the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sover-
eign power." 136 Thus, the modem cases that rely solely on state consent
and disregard limits on the size of enclaves 137 run contrary to the consti-
tutional balance implicit in the Enclave Clause.
C. "Other Property"
The Johnsons saw that there was a third class of federal land, which
the Property Clause called "other Property." Some conservative com-
mentators have suggested that "other Property" referred to any future ter-
135. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (quoting Coleman v. Thomp-
son, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991)). For a recognition of this basic principle by a commentator on
the Property Clause, see Patterson, supra note 2, at 67 (reservation of powers to the states un-
der the Constitution can't be altered by state-federal compact).
136. New York, 505 U.S. at 181.
137. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 186 F.3d 1055 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding Min-
nesota's implied cession to federal government of jurisdiction over waters in national park);
United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1971) (applying the Clause to the land and wa-
ters in a national park); see also Peterson v. United States, 191 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1951) (sus-
taining California's cession to the federal government of regulatory power over private land
within a national park). In Peterson the Court stated that:
no authority has been submitted nor does independent research reveal any basis for
concluding that the sovereign state may not, as part of its power of sovereignty, cede
part of its jurisdiction over privately owned property to its paramount sovereign
cases like the instant case. To the contrary, it is clear that such cessions of jurisdic-
tion, motivated by the comity between sovereigns, have been found to be lawful and
proper for the reason that they are necessary in order to secure the great public bene-
fits intended to be derived from the dedicated areas.
Id. at 156. As appears from the text above, the founders took precisely the opposite view of
the matter. See also infra notes 217-19 (describing the assertions of federalists Harry Innes
and Edmund that a free government has no just power to yield territorial sovereignty in a way
that disadvantaged some of its citizens).
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ritories, 138 but there is not much evidence for this position. On the con-
trary, the unmodified term "Territory" in the phrase, "The Congress shall
have Power to dispose of... the Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States" 139 was broad enough to include prospective acquisi-
tions, such as Canada, Florida, or Louisiana. Conservative commenta-
tors also have argued that "other Property" referred only to federal en-
claves and that the Constitution did not authorize other federal land
ownership within state boundaries. 140 However, even one without legal
training could see that because the Enclave Clause granted Congress au-
thority to "exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever" over
enclaves, if "other Property" had meant only enclaves then the power to
"make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting ... other Prop-
erty" 14 1 would have been superfluous. So "other Property" had to mean
something different from enclaves, and "Rules and Regulations" had to
mean something less than "exclusive Legislation."' 142
We can enlist the constitutional value of independence as a further
aid to interpreting the meaning of "other Property." 143 If Congress were
138. See, e.g., Brodie, supra note 2, at 720; Hardwicke, supra note 2, at 423; Patterson,
supra note 2, at 54.
139. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
140. See, e.g., Brodie, supra note 2; Hardwicke supra note 2; Patterson, supra note 2.
This view is based largely on the terms of land grants from states during the Confederation
period and shortly thereafter, and on language-arguably dictum-in Pollard v. Hagan, 44
U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). The Pollard language is arguably dictum because the constitutional
issue was unnecessary to the decision of the case, which could have been resolved on the terms
of the deeds of cession. The dictum is as follows:
And, if an express stipulation had been inserted in the agreement [i.e., the deed of
cession and associated legislation], granting the municipal right of sovereignty and
eminent domain to the United States, such stipulation would have been void and in-
operative; because the United States have no constitutional capacity to exercise mu-
nicipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eminent domain, within the limits of a state or
elsewhere, except in the cases in which it is expressly granted.
Id. at 223. The court then proceeded to reference the Enclave Clause.
Actually, the dictum is partially correct. The federal government may not enjoy a fully
"sovereign" right over a territory within a state except through the Enclave Clause. However,
applying this language to "other Property" is erroneous, because Congress may acquire and
own such property by reason of the Necessary and Proper Clause-i.e., by implication from
the enumerated powers. See infra Part IV.A-B.
141. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
142. As noted by one commentator, the Supreme Court has construed the Management
Power of the Property Clause so broadly that it nearly duplicates the Enclave Clause. Brodie,
supra note 2, at 711. But cf Appel, supra note 2, at 10 (asserting the federal government's
"sovereign" power over Article IV property). See also id. at 30 (stating that the federal gov-
ernment's power to arbitrate land claims suggested that it was not merely a proprietor but a
sovereign, but missing the difference: arbitration was mostly outside of states; proprietorship
was within).
143. See supra Part I.C.3.
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prohibited from holding non-enclave land, states could interfere readily
with the proper exercise of federal power. For years, Betsy Johnson and
others of her generation had witnessed the Confederation Congress being
held hostage to the whims of recalcitrant states. Like most of her con-
temporaries, she was absolutely sure she did not want that kind of ob-
struction to continue. "Posit a case, dear Husband," she told Mr. Johnson
in her contemporaneous English,
in which a Post Office Building or a Post Road or a Customs House
must needs qualify as an Enclave. The State where located could ob-
struct it merely by refusing to allow Congress to buy the needful
Land. Think on how the States have obstructed the Requisitions of
Congress under the Articles of Confederation. 'Tis just the Sort of
Infelicity this Constitution is designed to correct.
At some level, therefore, Mrs. Johnson would have understood that
interpreting "other Property" as enclaves alone would undercut a central
value she and the rest of her generation were trying to promote: inde-
pendence of governmental units from each other. 144 So for her, as it is
for me, the conclusion was inescapable: "other Property" was land within
the boundaries of a state, owned by the federal government, but not
qualifying as an enclave.
IV. FEDERAL POWERS OVER "OTHER PROPERTY"
A. Acquisition of "Other Property"
On rereading the Constitution, Mrs. Johnson noticed that, other than
in the Enclave Clause, the instrument granted no express or independent
capacity to acquire "other Property." 145 The Property Clause authorized
only management and disposal. However, after her talk with the family
lawyer, 146 she could see that several enumerated powers, particularly
when coupled with the Necessary and Proper Clause, granted consider-
able implied authority to acquire land. A government authorized to "es-
tablish Post Offices and post Roads"147 would have capacity to acquire
real estate for the purpose. The authority to govern relations with do-
144. See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875). This case effectively overruled the
dictum of Pollard that implied that the federal government may not own land within existing
states except pursuant to the Enclave Clause. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 212.
145. It does not explicitly deny the power either. Gaetke, supra note 2, at 633.
146. See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
147. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
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mestic Indian tribes 148 might imply a power to acquire and set aside land
for displaced tribes. 149 The government's powers to "constitute tribunals
inferior to the supreme Court," 150 "raise and support Armies, ' 151 and
"maintain a Navy" 152-even its need to house local tax, customs, and
commerce officersl 53-all suggested authority to acquire useful real es-
tate. From her modest reading in Greek and Roman classics, 154 Mrs.
Johnson knew that wars and treaties often lead to land acquisition and
cession. It followed that the Treaty Clause and the War Power also were
potential vehicles for federal land acquisition155-although land acquired
by war or treaty, being outside state. boundaries, would be "Territory"
and not "other Property." 156
Further, Mrs. Johnson could see that even though the Property
Clause expressly authorized only land management and disposal, it might
justify incidental acquisitions as well. Local farmers sometimes bought
adjacent land to make management of their own farms easier. Before
selling a parcel of land the previous year, her husband had acquired a
neighboring strip so as to command a much better price for the whole.
That Congress could do this was shown by the Necessary and Proper
Clause-with the caveat that any land purchase based on the Property
Clause would have to be truly incidental to management or disposal.
148. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("To regulate commerce ... with the Indian tribes"-called the
"Indian Commerce Clause"); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (treaty power).
149. Although the precise formula differs with the reservation, essentially the federal gov-
ernment retains legal title to reservation lands while tribes or individuals have equitable title.
Equitable title, therefore, is held by entities other than the United States, having been given to
the tribes or individuals under the Disposal Power of the Property Clause. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl.2.
Because it is held by the United States, legal title (and ultimate Management Power) over res-
ervation land is federal property under the Property Clause, while equitable title is not. Sug-
gestions that legal title is not federal "property" may derive from a misunderstanding of the
principles of trust and property title law. See, e.g., FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 210 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982). However, as in other trusts, the fed-
eral government's Management Powers pursuant to legal title are circumscribed by the fiduci-
ary relationship. Id. at 221-28. In the text, I state "might imply," because most land ownership
seems remote from regulating commerce. See infra Part IV.C.3 (discussing pre-ratification
federalist representations that real estate would be within the ambit of state, not federal,
power).
150. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
151. Id. art. 1, §8, cl. 12.
152. Id. art. I, §8, cl. 13.
153. Id. art. I, §8, cl. 1, 3.
154. See supra note 29 on the founding generation's fascination with the classics.
155. Cf Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) (upholding the Louisiana Pur-
chase under the treaty and war powers).
156. See supra Part III.A.
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Congress would not be permitted to purchase acreage for unenumerated
reasons, by using the Property Clause as a "pretext." 157
So the natural understanding of the land acquisition power was
broader than some conservative commentators claim it is.
B. Retention of "Other Property "for Enumerated Purposes
If Congress had incidental power to acquire land for enumerated
purposes, it certainly had incidental power to retain land for such pur-
poses. Land within new states -necessary for military installations, for
example, could be retained, 158 even if that land could not qualify as an
enclave because the local legislature objected.
At the time of the ratification, the idea that the central government
would retain some non-enclave land seems to have been more assumed
than mentioned. Sometimes, however, it was explicitly mentioned. At
the Virginia ratifying convention, the anti-federalist William Grayson
suggested that federal holdings in the territories could survive creation of
states there, and no one contradicted him. The report of Grayson's
speech seems garbled, but the import is still clear: even after states were
created in the territories, Congress would retain soil for enumerated pur-
poses, without the consent of those states. Grayson began with the En-
clave Clause, and then passed to consideration of other federal lands:
157. That Congress must limit itself to effectuating enumerated powers was affirmed in
M'Culloch v. Maryland:
[S]hould Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the ac-
complishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it would become the pain-
ful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to
say that such an act was not the law of the land.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.).
158. 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 135 (statement of the "Inhabitants of
Pittsburgh" on the need for federal protection in western territories, Nov. 11, 1787). See also
Letter from James Madison to George Nicholas (May 17, 1788), in 9 id. at 809 ("The new
Govt. and that alone will be able to take the requisite measures for getting into our hands the
Western [military] posts [from the British]."); 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 189
(Oliver Ellsworth, speaking at the Connecticut ratifying convention):
If we go on as we have done, what is to become of the foreign debt? Will sov-
ereign nations forgive us this debt, because we neglect to pay? or will they levy it by
reprisals, as the laws of nations authorize them? Will our weakness induce Spain to
relinquish the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi, or the territory which she
claims on the east side of that river? Will our weakness induce the British to give
up the northern posts? If a war breaks out, and our situation invites our enemies to
make war, how are we to defend ourselves? Has government the means to enlist a
man or buy an ox?
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It is answered that the consent of the state must be required [for an
enclave], or else they [i.e., Congress] cannot have such a district, or
places for the erecting of forts, &c. But how much is already given
them! Look at the great country to the north-west of the Ohio, ex-
tending to and commanding the lakes.
Look at the other end of the Ohio, towards South Carolina, ex-
tending to the Mississippi. See what these, in process of time, may
amount to. They [i.e., Congress] may grant exclusive privileges to
any particular part of which they have the possession. But it may be
observed that those extensive countries will be formed into independ-
ent states, and that their [i.e., the new states'] consent will be neces-
sary. To this I answer, that they [Congress] may still grant such
privileges as, in that country, are already granted to Congress by the
states [i.e., through the enumerated powers and Confederation-era
land grants]. The grants of Virginia, South Carolina, and other states,
will be subservient to Congress in this respect. Of course, it results
from the whole, that requiring the consent of the states will be no
guard against this abuse of power. 
15 9
C. Retention of "Other Property "for Non-Enumerated Purposes
1. Textual Analysis
Modem liberal cases and commentators interpret the Property
Clause's Management Power (to "make all needful Rules and Regula-
tions respecting" federal land) as authorizing indefinite retention of tracts
for unenumerated purposes. 160 It is unlikely that Betsy Johnson would
have understood it that way. The Property Clause said nothing about re-
tention. It authorized management and disposal. The Management
Power assumed as a background fact that the federal government would
own some land-acquired by cession, for example, or pursuant to its
enumerated powers-and permitted Congress to craft "all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting" that land.
159. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 434.
160. See, e.g., Vogler v. United States, 859 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that Con-
gress has the power to retain federal land for "important" public purposes); Appel, supra note
2, at 91-92 (arguing management actions under the Property Clause should be treated as the
so-called Spending Clause now is: authorizing governmental action untethered to any enumer-
ated power).
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Indeed, as Mrs. Johnson may have noticed, the Management Power
was only one of several provisions imposing procedural rules on the ex-
ercise of powers granted elsewhere. 161 For example, the Appropriation
Clause did not actually authorize appropriations. 162 They .were author-
ized by other parts of the document. 163 Rather, the Appropriations
Clause (a) assumed as a background fact that there would be federal
funds and appropriations arising from the exercise of other powers and
(b) established rules for them. In like manner, the Property Clause's
Management Power did not authorize ownership. It merely authorized
management of land owned for other reasons.
Strengthening the conclusion that the Management Power, and
therefore the lands managed, had to be tied to enumerated authority, was
that tell-tale word "needful." This was the same word Mrs. Johnson had
noticed in her power of attorney and in the Enclave Clause. 164 The
Property Clause did not grant Congress power to make all rules and
regulations, nor "all rules and regulations as Congress shall deem need-
ful." It granted only the power to make "all needful rules and regula-
tions." Needful for what? Needful for the exercise of jurisdiction Con-
gress was given elsewhere. 165 In other words, as Chief Justice John
Marshall was to suggest some years later, 166 congressional rules and
regulations were to be of the sort "needful" to execute one or more ex-
press federal powers-not "needful" in the abstract. 167
161. In addition to the Appropriation Clause, discussed in the text, see, for example, U.S.
CONST. art I, § 7, cl. 1 ("All bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Represen-
tatives"). This clause did not authorize revenue-raising bills-for which the primary authority
is art. I, § 8, cl. 1-but assumes that there will be such bills pursuant to other parts of the Con-
stitution, and establishes a rule for them. See also id. art. I, § 5, cl.2 (empowering each house
of Congress to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings"); id. art. I, § 5, el. 3 (providing that
"Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same,
excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the
Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those present, be
entered on the Journal."). Neither of these two latter clauses authorizes proceedings, but they
establish rules for proceedings authorized elsewhere in the instrument.
162. Id. art. I, § 9, cl.7 ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence
of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Ex-
penditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.").
163. See id. art. I, § 8.
164. See supra notes 99-113 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text.
166. M'Cullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 422 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.) ("The
power to 'make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property be-
longing to the United States,' is not more comprehensive than the power 'to make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution' the powers of the govern-
ment.").
167. Thus, the analysis of the word in Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1988) would
seem to be contrary to its function in the document. Kleppe reached its conclusion without
historical investigation into the drafting or ratification of the Constitution. See also Appel,
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In sharp contrast to the qualified nature of the Management Power
was the unqualified nature of the Disposal Power. 168 The Property
Clause stated unconditionally: "The Congress shall have Power to dis-
pose of... other Property belonging to the United States." 169 In other
words, the capacity to dispose, unlike that of management, was a power
unqualified by any other.
At first glance, the Disposal Power might have seemed permissive
only: Congress could, but was not required to, dispose. In some con-
texts, however, a power permissive in form can become mandatory in
fact. At the North Carolina ratifying convention, the federalist floor
leader (and later Supreme Court Justice) James Iredell compared the
Constitution's grant of powers to Congress to a grant under a power of
attorney. 170 His analogy suggests the following illustration:
The power of attorney Edmund and Betsy Johnson signed in their
lawyer's office granted authority to an agent to carry on a retail busi-
ness. As part of that authority, the document gave the agent power to
manage two parcels of land, Blackacre and Whiteacre, which the
Johnsons hoped would prove suitable for retail shops. The document
also authorized the agent to sell property. Blackacre proved suitable
for retailing, but Whiteacre did not. The agent had no authority to
engage in land speculation or other ventures unrelated to retailing. In
absence of a further grant of authority from the Johnsons, therefore,
the agent's exercise of the power to sell Whiteacre became manda-
supra note 2, at 10 (claiming that the Property Clause is "unconditional," without considering
the limiting effect of the word "needful").
168. This power is subject to fiduciary limitations, however. See infra Part IV.C.4. Cf
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936) (use of Property Clause to justify fed-
erally-owned electricity generation business).
169. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. Initially, the Supreme Court upheld broad Congres-
sional authority in disposition cases. United States v. City & County of San Francisco, 310
U.S. 16 (1940); Gibson v. Choteau, 80 U.S. 92 (1872); United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526
(1840) (involving land leasing, a form of disposition). The Court later conceded the same
broad authority to the management portion of the Property Clause. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 529.
In doing so, the Court was encouraged by careless language in some of the disposition cases.
See, e.g., Gibson, 80 U.S, at 99 ("With respect to the public domain, the Constitution vests in
Congress the power of disposition and of making all needful rules and regulations. That power
is subject to no limitations."). This development disregards the difference in the wording of
the management and disposal powers.
170. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 148 ("It is a declaration of particular powers
by the people to their representatives, for particular purposes. It may be considered as a great
power of attorney, under which no power can be exercised but what is expressly given."). See
also 2 id. at 166 (repeating same argument).
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tory. Of course, the agent was permitted to exercise reasonable dis-
cretion as to the timing and terms of the sale. 17 1
To summarize: textual analysis suggests that because all powers not
granted were reserved and because the Constitution conferred no inde-
pendent power to acquire or retain "other Property," the original meaning
of the Constitution was that the federal government was required to dis-
pose of any land not "necessary" or "needful" for enumerated purposes.
2. Corroborating Evidence from the Founding Generation's
Constitutional Values
The founding generation's constitutional values 172 support the con-
clusion that Congress was required to dispose of all "other Property" un-
needed for enumerated purposes. We have seen that allowing the federal
government to own intra-state lands for enumerated purposes protected
federal independence from the states, since the federal government did
not need to obtain state permission to do its job. 173 Correspondingly,
denying the federal government the power to retain other intra-state lands
helped preserve the independence of states and citizens from the federal
government.
In addition, limiting federal land ownership promoted the constitu-
tional value of decentralization174 because it prevented the central gov-
ernment from engaging in activities (such as business activities) outside
the scope of its agency.
The values of sympathy and public trust rules of impartiality re-
quired the central government to treat different parts of the country
equally, 175 insofar as practical. 176 Neither sympathy nor impartiality is
171. Cf Brodie, supra note 2, at 711. This original understanding would seem to be con-
trary to cases such as Vogler v. United States, 859 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that Con-
gress has the power to retain federal land for "important" public purposes) and Fay v. United
States, 204 F. 559 (1st Cir. 1913) (holding that the United States has the power to acquire land
and use it for any public purpose). It may also contradict Russia v. National City Bank of New
York, 69 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1934) (holding that because the United States is in the nature of a
corporate entity, it has a "common law right" to acquire property). Of course, the United
States has no "common law" rights; it has enumerated powers, and the implied powers inci-
dent to them.
172. See supra Part I.C.3.
173. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
174. See supra Part I.C.3.
175. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
176. Of course, some disparities of treatment are unavoidable, given differences among
states. To offer one example: some states are more appropriate for military installations than
others. To offer another: some have more foreign commerce than others. But cf United States
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fostered when the federal government owns most of the territory of some
states and very little in others. Indeed, James Madison strongly argued
that adoption of the Constitution would, by encouraging privatization of
western lands, lead to "greater. .. sympathy between the whole and each
particular part."'177 Although anti-federalists contended that widespread
federal land ownership would empower the government to create pro-
tected commercial enclaves and other special privileges in violation of
both of those values, federalists responded that the anti-federalist inter-
pretation was incorrect because it was at odds with the spirit of public
trust enshrined in the Constitution. 178 We should take them at their
word.
3. Corroborating Evidence from the Ratification Records: In
General
The ratification records do not shed as much light on the meaning of
the Property Clause as they do for some other constitutional provisions,
because the participants did not publish exhaustive analyses of the Prop-
erty Clause as they did for some other provisions. For example, James
Madison's reference to the clause in Federalist No. 43 is quite brief,179
presumably because the issues involved were "sufficiently known to the
public."1 80 So, too, was the treatment in another thoughtful survey of the
Constitution, written by the pseudonymous "A Native of Virginia." 181
v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950) (equal footing doctrine applies to political rights and sover-
eignty, not economic stature or property ownership).
177. Letter from James Madison to George Nicholas (May 17, 1788), in 9 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 805.
178. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Oct. 18, 1787), in 13 id. at 408
(suggesting that granting monopolies would be a breach of trust and outside Congress' enu-
merated powers).
Sir Edward Coke, the great proto-Whig and legal mentor of the founding generation was
the most famous exponent of anti-monopoly sentiments. See, e.g., 11 Coke Rep. 84b, 77 Eng.
Rep. 1260 (1602) (his report of The Case of Monopolies); 3 THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF SIR
EDWARD COKE 1201 (Steve Sheppard ed. 2003).
179. The following is the entire text of Madison's treatment:
To dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the terri-
tory or other property, belonging to the United States, with a proviso, that nothing in
the constitution shall be so construed, as to prejudice any claims of the United
States, or of any particular State.
This is a power of very great importance, and required by considerations, simi-
lar to those which show the propriety of the former. The proviso annexed is proper
in itself, and was probably rendered absolutely necessary by jealousies and ques-
tions concerning the western territory sufficiently known to the public.
THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison), supra note 2, at 224.
180. Id.
181. 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 688.
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Yet parts of the ratification record do confirm that the federal govern-
ment was not to retain "other Property" for unenumerated purposes.
There were, first of all, the federalist representations that jurisdic-
tion over real property would be a state, not a federal, matter. As noted
earlier, advocates of the Constitution responded to their opponents' fears
of an all-powerful central government by publicly listing the government
functions that would be outside the national sphere. Preeminent among
these functions was control of land.182 Federalist writers and orators ag-
gressively represented that real property within state boundaries would
be almost exclusively an area of state concern. 183 The states were to en-
joy exclusive power over land titles, 184 land transfers, 185 and inheri-
tance186-virtually all aspects of real estate law and usage. 187  The
182. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
183. Natelson, Enumerated, supra note 2, at 481-82.
184. See 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 599 ("A.B.," Hampshire Gazette,
Jan. 2, 1788,) (citing title to lands); 8 id. at 404 (Alexander White, a leading Virginia lawyer
and legislator, citing "titles of lands" as out of the reach of Congress); 15 id. at 508 (Tench
Coxe as "A Freeman," asserting that forbidding entails will be "exclusively in the power of the
state legislatures").
185. See 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 40 (Chancellor Edmund Pendleton at the
Virginia ratifying convention, stating, "[The Constitution] only extends to the general purposes
of the Union. It does not intermeddle with the local, particular affairs of the states. Can Con-
gress legislate for the state of Virginia? Can they make a law altering the form of transferring
property, or the rule of descents, in Virginia?"); 3 id. at 553 (John Marshall, speaking at the
same convention); THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 2, at 141
(strongly implying that federal power does not include "varying the rules of descent, and of the
alienation of landed property"). But see Maryland Resolutions, in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 2, at 551.
186. See 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 568 (Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant, a
justice-soon thereafter Chief Justice-of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court); 8 id. at
404 (Alexander White, stating that "the right of altering the laws of descents and distribution
of the effects of deceased persons and titles of land" were all "clearly out of the power of Con-
gress"); 15 id. at 508 (Tench Coxe as "A Freeman," asserting that "Regulating the law of de-
scents" will be "exclusively in the power of the state legislatures"); 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, su-
pra note 2, at 620 (James Madison at the Virginia ratifying convention, assuming the federal
government could not alter the law of descents); 3 id. at 40 (Chancellor Edmund Pendleton at
the Virginia ratifying convention arguing that the federal government will not able to alter law
of descent in Virginia); THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 2, at 141
(implying the federal government could not alter the law of descents); THE FEDERALIST No.
33 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 2, at 160 (stating the same).
187. 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 79 (Harrington implying that the federal
government would not control "real estates"); 5 id. at 568 (Justice Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant
arguing for a law of partition in state sphere); 5 id. at 652 (Massachusetts Gazette opining that
land officers and surveyors would be within the state sphere); 8 id. at 404 (Alexander White
stating that real estate titles and certain land uses--"fowling, hunting, and fishing"-were out-
side federal jurisdiction); 16 id. at 51 (Tench Coxe, claiming that the states retain "[tihe lord-
ship of the soil," which "remains in full perfection in every state"); THE FEDERALIST NO. 17
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 2, at 80-81 (claiming agriculture out of the federal sphere).
See also I THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN DICKINSON 1764-1774 xvi (Paul Leicester
Ford ed., Da Capo Press 1970) (1895). Dickinson, another leading lawyer, is noted therein to
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much-published federalist writer Tench Coxe, in his second "Freeman"
essay, was quite specific: "[t]he states," he wrote, "are to hold separate
territorial rights, and the domestic jurisdiction thereof, exclusively of
any interference of the fcederal government." 188
Given the copious promulgation and ultimate public acceptance of
such representations, it seems unlikely that Mrs. Johnson would have un-
derstood the Constitution as authorizing permanent federal land owner-
ship within organized states on a large scale.
There is another piece of evidence that disposal of property not held
for enumerated purposes was to be mandatory: the universal expectation
that the lands would, in fact, be disposed of.189 This expectation will be
explored in greater detail below, 190 but consider first an admission from
a framer who wanted the federal government to retain large tracts of de-
pendent territory. In 1803, Gouverneur Morris, the principal polisher of
the finished Constitution, confessed that he would have liked to have
written the Property Clause so that Canada and Louisiana, once acquired,
could be governed perpetually as federal provinces. 191 He acknowl-
edged, however, that there was little he could do to further that vision,
because his fellow delegates did not agree with him.192 Those delegates
have approvingly quoted Lord Chatham (William Pitt the Elder), who in 1774 spoke on behalf
of the colonies. He divided British and colonial responsibility in a way that foreshadowed the
division of federal and state responsibility:
As an Englishman, I recognize to the Americans, their supreme unalterable right of
property. As an American, I would equally recognize to England, her supreme right
of regulating commerce and navigation. The distinction is involved in the abstract
nature of things; property is private, individual, absolute; the touch of another anni-
hilates it. Trade is an extended and complicated consideration; it reaches as far as
ships can sail, or winds can blow; it is a vast and various machine. To regulate the
numberless movements of its several parts, and combine them into one harmonious
effect, for the good of the whole, requires the superintending wisdom and energy of
the supreme power of the empire.
l id. at xvi.
188. 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 509. This essay was printed in the
Pennsylvania Gazette on January 30, 1788, and reprinted in two or three other newspapers. 15
id. at 511 n.1.
189. This is virtually conceded by advocates of federal retention. See, e.g., Gaetke, supra
note 2, at 638.
190. See infra Part IV.C.4.
191. This is post-ratification evidence, and therefore less reliable than pre-ratification evi-
dence. See supra Part I.C.2. On the other hand, it also is an admission against interest.
192. Morris admitted:
I always thought that, when we should acquire Canada and Louisiana it would be
proper to govern them as provinces, and allow them no voice in our councils. In
wording the third section of the fourth article, I went as far as circumstances would
permit to establish the exclusion. Candor obliges me to add my belief, that, had it
been more pointedly expressed, a strong opposition would have been made.
[Vol. 76
HeinOnline  -- 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 368 2005
THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING
adopted the Property Clause amid an almost universal assumption that its
most important function was to promote land disposition and the creation
of new states. 193
4. Corroborating Evidence from the Ratification Records:
Guidelines for Disposition
Textual analysis showed that the Property Clause's Disposal Power,
while permissive in form, was, as to land not "needful" for enumerated
purposes, mandatory in fact. 194 That this was the original meaning is
corroborated by contemporary records showing a universal expectation
of disposal, by a congressional ordinance contemplating disposal, 195 and
a high level of agreement on how the lands were to be alienated and how
the proceeds were to be used. For example, in a lengthy letter written on
May 17, 1788, to another influential Virginia federalist, Madison dis-
cussed what he saw as the many benefits adoption of the Constitution
would bring to the West. 196 Madison made no mention of the federal
government retaining ownership of land, except perhaps for military pur-
poses. 197 His focus was exclusively on how "the establishment of the
new Govt. will thus promote the sale of the public lands" 198 and "[t]he
protection and security which the new Government promises to purchas-
ers of the federal lands," 199 and the many other benefits that would flow
from privatization. The universal desire was that land should be dis-
posed of in accordance with the standards of public trust. Luther Martin,
the Attorney General of Maryland, a federal convention delegate, and an
anti-federalist, expressed the majority view when he wrote of "[1]ands
which were acquired by the common blood and treasure, and which
ought to have been the common stock, and for the common benefit of the
Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W. Livingston (Dec. 4, 1803), in 3 Farrand, supra
note 2, at 404.
193. See 2 id. at 457-59, 461-66.
194. See supra Part IV.C. 1.
195. For example, this expectation was reflected in Congress's Land Ordinance of 1785,
which stated: "Be it ordained by the United States in Congress assembled, that the territory
ceded by individual States to the United States, which has been purchased of the Indian inhabi-
tants, shall be disposed of in the following manner," and then proceeded to outline the manner.
28 J. CONTINENTAL CONG. 375 (1785), available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
biriampage?collld=lljc&fileName=028/lljc028.db&recNum=386&itemLink-r?ammem/hlaw:
@field(DOCID+@lit(ic02899)):%230280387&linkText=l (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
196. Letter from James Madison to George Nicholas (May 17, 1788), in 9 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 804-10.
197. 9 id. at 809 (acquisition of western posts from the British).
198. 9 id. at 806.
199. 9 id. at 805.
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Union." 200 Martin's prescription was consistent with the formula under
which Virginia 201 and other states 20 2 ceded their vast claims in the Old
Northwest "as a common fund" for the "use and benefit" (a classic trust
phrase) of the United States.
Both the friends of the Constitution203 and their opponents204
agreed that the best method of carrying out this trust responsibility was to
200. 16 id. at 42 (writing as "Genuine Information").
201. 25 J. CONTINENTAL CONG. 561 (1783), available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/ampage?collld=lljc&fileName=025/lljc025.db&recNunv=34&itemLink-r?ammem/haw:
@field(DOCID+@litocO2510)):%230250035&linkText=l (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
202. For example, New York. See 19 J. CONTINENTAL CONG. 208-09 (1781), available at
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(jc01957)) (last vis-
ited Jan. 20, 2005). Georgia's act of cession on February 1, 1788 ceded "for the use and bene-
fit of the said United States" but did not use the common fund language. 3 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 292.
203. For examples of federalist sentiment, see 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2,
at 549-55 ("Aristides," William Contee Hanson, writing of the importance of western territory
being in the common stock); Letter from George Washington to the Marquis de Lafayette
(Feb. 7, 1788), in 16 id. at 71 ("A spirit of emigration to the western Country is very predomi-
nant. Congress have sold, in the year past, a pretty large quantity of lands on the Ohio, for
public Securities, and thereby diminished the domestic debt considerably. Many of your Mili-
tary acquaintances ... propose settling there. From such beginnings much may be ex-
pected."); Letter from George Thatcher to Pierce Long (Apr. 23, 1788), in 16 id. at 199-200
(doubting whether sale of western land will be sufficient to pay off debts); Letter from James
Madison to George Nicholas (May 17, 1788), in 18 id. at 24-25 (contending that adoption of
Constitution will increase sympathy between East and West and encourage sale of lands to pay
off debts); 18 id. at 372-73 (the Pennsylvania Packet opining on the value of land cession by
Georgia in paying off public debt, and calling the cession a tribute to the new Constitution).
At the Massachusetts ratifying convention, Nathaniel Gorham complained about the slow
rate at which the Confederation Congress was selling land to pay off the debt:
The Hon. Mr. GORHAM... added, that, during the session of the federal Conven-
tion, when seven states only were represented in Congress, application was made by
two companies for the purchase of lands, the sale of which would have sunk seven
or eight millions of dollars of the Continental debt, and the most pressing letters
were sent on to Rhode Island to send on its delegates; but that state refused: the con-
sequence was, the contract could not then be made.
2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 23. For other comments, see 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 359 (American Herald, December 3, 1787, opining, "by the sale of
our lands the principal of our debt every day dec[r]eases") (alteration in original); 17 id. at 131
(Congressional request that Georgia cede so lands could be sold to pay debts); Letter from
Charles Thomson to James McHenry (Apr. 19, 1788), in 17 id. at 178-79.
204. Anti-federalists generally argued that land sales were going well enough that ratifica-
don of the Constitution was not necessary. See, e.g., 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
2, at 342--43 ("Agrippa," an anti-federalist):
The embar[r]assments consequent upon a war, and the usual reduction of prices
immediately after a war, necessarily occasioned a want of punctuality in publick
payments. Still however the publick debt has been very considerably reduced, not
by the dirty and delusive scheme of depreciation, but the nominal sum. Applica-
tions are continually making for purchases in our eastern and western lands. Great
exertions are making for clearing off the arrears of outstanding taxes, so that the cer-
tificates for interest on the state debt have considerably increased in value. This is a
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sell the land to private parties. The sale proceeds would be employed for
the common benefit in two principal respects. 20 5  Initially, those pro-
ceeds would pay off the public debt.20 6 After that, they would be applied
to reduce taxes. 20 7 Sales of western land, coupled with the federal gov-
certain indication of returning credit. Congress this year disposed of a large tract of
their lands towards paying the principal of their debt. Pennsylvania has discharged
the whole of their part of the continental debt. New-York has nearly cleared its state
debt, and has located a large part of their new lands towards paying the continental
demands. Other states have made considerable payments. Every day from these
considerations the publick ability and inclination to satisfy their creditors increases.
See also 4 id. at 381 ("Agrippa" writing, "The Congress lands are fully adequate to the re-
demption of the principal of their debt, and are selling and populating very fast. The lands of
this state, at the west, are, at the moderate price of eighteen pence an acre, worth near half a
million pounds in our money. They ought, therefore, to be sold as quick as possible."); 5 id. at
484, 577-78 ("Agrippa," expressing similar sentiments). For other examples of similar anti-
federalist statements, see 14 id. at 20 ("Federal Farmer"-possibly Richard Henry Lee); 14 id.
at 319-20 ("Centinel"); 14 id. at 361 ("Cincinnatus"); 17 id. at 151 ("A Plebean"--Melancton
Smith); 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 276 (William Grayson, at the Virginia ratifying
convention); 3 id. at 278 (same). See also 2 id. at 211 (Robert R. Livingston, commenting at
the New York ratifying convention):
He observed, that a considerable proportion of our domestic debt was already in the
treasury, and though we were indebted for a part of this to our citizens, yet that debt
was comparatively small, and could easily be extinguished by an honest exertion on
the part of the government. He observed, that our back lands were competent to the
discharge of our foreign debt, if a vigorous government should be adopted, which
would enable us to avail ourselves of this resource; so that we might look forward to
a day when no other taxes would be required from us than such as would be neces-
sary to support our internal government, the amount of the impost being more than
adequate to the other expenses of the Union.
2 id.
205. See Appel, supra note 2, at 29-30. The Virginia "common fund" formula was fol-
lowed in other cessions, both before and after ratification. For example, in late 1789, the
North Carolina legislature ceded the territory that later became Tennessee to the United States
under condition that the land be used "for a common fund for the use and benefit of the United
States of America." The terms of the cession and the subsequent deed are located at 1
DOCUMENTS LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES IN
RELATION TO THE PUBLIC LANDS 97-98 (1834), available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
ampage?collld=llsp&fileName=028/llsp028.db&recNum=106 and http://memory.loc.gov/
cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsp&fileName=028/llsp028.db&recNum=107 (last visited Nov. 7,
2004).
206. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to George Nicholas (May 17, 1788), in 9
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 806; Noah Webster, Connecticut Courant, Nov. 20,
1786, in 3 id. at 10. See also supra note 200.
207. See, e.g., Publicola (Archibald Maclaine), An Address to the Freemen of North Caro-
lina (Mar. 20, 1789), in 16 id. at 441:
Taxes are necessary for the support of every government, and though we shall al-
ways have a state establishment to support, the taxes for the union will be applied
for our protection and defence from foreign enemies . . . But it is not probable, in
our present situation, that the federal government will want any direct taxes from the
states, for a considerable time to come ... But the sale of the western territory, and
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emnment's services as an impartial arbiter of conflicting land claims, 20 8
would benefit the commonality in nonfinancial ways as well. They
would bring about the settlement of the west-a great increase in the
American population, largely from European immigration.20 9 This
population increase would render the new nation more militarily defensi-
the duties arising from imposts, will, in all probability, be more than equal to our
wants while we continue in peace.
See also Letter from Charles Thomson to James McHenry (Apr. 19, 1788), in 17 id. at 178-79;
2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 211 (Robert R. Livingston, speaking at the New York
ratifying convention); 4 id. at 189-190 (Archibald Maclaine, stating at the North Carolina rati-
fying convention, "Congress will not lay a single tax when it is not to the advantage of the
people at large. The western lands will also be a considerable fund. The sale of them will aid
the revenue greatly .... I am not unacquainted with the territory or resources of this country.
The resources, under proper regulations, are very great. In the course of a few years, we can
raise money without borrowing a single shilling."). But see 3 id. at 214-15 (James Monroe, an
anti-federalist, discussing sources of confederation revenue at the Virginia ratifying conven-
tion):
May we not suppose, when the general government will lay what duties it may think
proper, that the amount will be very considerable? There are other resources. The
back lands have already been looked upon as a very important resource. When we
view the western extensive territory, and contemplate the fertility of the soil, the no-
ble rivers which penetrate it, and the excellent navigation which may be had there,
may we not depend on this as a very substantial resource?
3 id.
208. Governor Edmund Randolph, at the Virginia ratifying convention, contrasted the
value of a federal arbitrator with the former situation:
Before the revolution, there was a contest about those back lands, in which even
government was a party; it was put an end to by the war. Pennsylvania was ready to
enter into a war with us, for the disputed lands near the boundaries, and nothing but
the superior prudence of the man who was at the head of affairs in Virginia could
have prevented it.
3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 76. Anti-federalists argued that the Confederation had
been successful in resolving land disputes. See, e.g., 3 id. at 212 (James Monroe-then an
anti-federalist and later President of the United States-speaking at the Virginia ratifying con-
vention); 3 id. at 277 (William Grayson, speaking at the same convention). Anti-federalists
also argued that a government organized under the Constitution would deprive honest settlers
of their land titles. See, e.g., 3 id. at 270 (George Mason, speaking at the Virginia ratifying
convention).
209. See "The Republican VII," CONN. COURANT, Mar. 26, 1787, in 3 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, at 35-37; Letter from James Madison to George Nicholas (May 17, 1788), in 9 id. at
805 (speaking of the benefit of population increase arising from land sales); 2 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 2, at 419 (James Wilson, speaking at the Pennysylvania ratifying con-
vention, stating "Numerous states yet unformed, myriads of the human race, who will inhabit
regions hitherto uncultivated, were to be affected by the result of their proceedings."); 3 id. at
312 (James Madison, at the Virginia ratifying convention, stating, "If we afford protection to
the western country, we shall see it rapidly peopled."). See also CHARLES PAGE SMITH,
JAMES WILSON: FOUNDING FATHER 163-66 (1956), for a description of the process by which
James Wilson and his partner, Dorsey Pentecost projected that land was to be staked out, pri-
vatized, sold to immigrants, and formed into new states.
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ble. 210 The United States then could protect her interests on the Missis-
sippi River and in the northwest 211 and play a larger role on the world
stage. Greater population and military strength would open new markets
for all Americans and would tie Americans together into one nation. 212
As James Wilson argued at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention:
[i]t is a maxim of every government, and it ought to be a maxim with
us, that the increase of numbers increases the dignity and security,
and the respectability, of all governments. It is the first command
given by the Deity to man, Increase and multiply. This applies with
peculiar force to this country, the smaller part of whose territory is
yet inhabited. We are representatives, sir, not merely of the present
age, but of future times; not merely of the territory along the
sea-coast, but of regions immensely extended westward. We should
fill, as fast as possible, this extensive country, with men who shall
live happy, free, and secure. To accomplish this great end ought to
be the leading view of all our patriots and statesmen.2 13
210. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 72-73 (Governor Edmund Randolph, at the
Virginia ratifying convention, lamenting that the lack of population in the western territories
rendered defense against the Indians more difficult). On the other hand, Patrick Henry denied
that the Constitution was necessary for development of the backcountry and resultant military
protection. 3 id. at 155.
211. Letter from James Madison to George Nicholas (May 17, 1788), in 9 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 806; 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 189 (Oliver Ellsworth,
speaking at the Connecticut ratifying convention); 3 id. at 231 (John Marshall, speaking of the
Mississippi at the Virginia ratifying convention: "To the debility of the Confederation alone
may justly be imputed every cause of complaint on this subject."); 3 id. at 239 (George Nicho-
las, speaking at the same convention).
212. James Madison to George Nicholas, May 17, 1788, in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 805. See also David Ramsey, Oration of June 5, 1788, in 18 id. at 158, 161
(arguing that Constitution will protect commerce and navigation, and thereby unite East and
West). But cf 5 id. at 515-16 ("Agrippa," arguing against the Constitution):
The common conclusion from this [pro-Constitution] reasoning is an exceed-
ingly unfair one, that [in the event of rejection] we must then separate, and form dis-
tinct confederacies. This would be true if there was no principle to substitute in the
room of power. Fortunately there is one. This is commerce. All the states have lo-
cal advantages, and in a considerable degree separate interests. They are, therefore,
in a situation to supply each other's wants.... The same principles apply to the
connection with the new settlers in the west. Many supplies they want, for which
they must look to the older settlements, and the greatness of their crops enables
them to make payments. Here then we have a bond of union which applies to all
parts of the empire, and would continue to operate if the empire comprehended all
America.
5 id.
213. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 462. Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, a fed-
eral convention delegate (where he served on the Committee of Detail) and later Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, expressed a similar view of the beneficent effects of population in-
crease. See 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 368 (stating, under the pen name of
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The founders hoped the increase of population would make feasible
the creation and admission of new states. 214 They would not have
agreed, however, with conservative commentators who argue that federal
lands should have been ceded to the governments of those new states.
The founding generation sought to build the nation by land privatization,
not through state land holdings.215
Indeed, the ratification record suggests that gratuitous transfer of
lands to state governments would have been seen as a "partial" act, and
therefore a breach of public trust. Value was to be derived from land for
the benefit of all Americans, not merely for those who lived in the vicin-
ity. During the ratification debates no one suggested deeding western
lands to new state governments. The talk was all of privatization, with
proceeds to be used to benefit the commonality. More importantly, par-
ticipants in the ratification debates took firm stands against any land dis-
position that would benefit one part of the nation at the expense of other
parts.
For example, at the North Carolina ratifying convention, delegates
such as William Porter sought reassurance that the new government
would not make a treaty "which will be of great advantage to the North-
ern States, and equal injury to the Southern States" by "giv[ing] up the
"A Landholder," that "Long experience hath taught that the number of industrious inhabitants
in any climate is not only the strength, but the wealth of a state.").
214. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to George Nicholas (May 17, 1788), in 9
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 805; David Ramsey, Oration of June 5, 1788, in 18
id. at 158, 164. See also 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 238-39 (Alexander Hamilton,
speaking at the New York ratifying convention):
The Congress is to consist, at first, of ninety-one members. This, to a reasonable
man, may appear as near the proper medium as any number whatever, at least for
the present. There is one source of increase, also, which does not depend upon any
constructions of the Constitution; it is the creation of new states. Vermont, Ken-
tucky, and Franklin [Tennessee] will probably become independent [of New York,
Virginia, and North Carolina]. New members of the Union will also be formed
from the unsettled tracts of western territory.
See also 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 688 ("A Native of Virginia," pointing
out, for those inclined to be suspicious of the North, that most new states would be created
from territories in the Southwest); 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 585 (James Madison,
at the Virginia ratifying convention, arguing that the Constitution will increase the likelihood
of new states being admitted to the union).
215. See United States v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 1314 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the federal
government is not required to turn over federal lands to a state on its admission to the union).
See also United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950) (equal footing doctrine applies to politi-
cal rights and sovereignty, not economic stature or property ownership); Gaetke, supra note 2,
at 643. This is conceded by one of the commentators favoring disposition of federal property.
Patterson, supra note 2, at 61-62.
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rivers and territory of the Southern States." 216 At the all-important Vir-
ginia ratifying convention, fear that the federal government might dis-
pose of lands "partially" (i.e., in violation of the trust duty of impartial-
ity) became a prominent issue. Patrick Henry and other anti-federalists
charged that the new government's land Disposal Power might be em-
ployed to prevent Americans from the navigating the Mississippi. This
would greatly disadvantage Kentucky, then a "District" still administered
by Virginia. Mindful of the Jay-Gardoqui treaty negotiations with Spain
that had threatened to cede navigation of the Mississippi, the Constitu-
tion's opponents contended that federal officials might use the Treaty
Power to make land cessions that would disadvantage the South. 217
They pointed out that under the Articles of Confederation, major deci-
sions required the agreement of at least nine, and sometimes all thirteen,
states-while under the Constitution, the seven states north of the Ma-
son-Dixon line would control Congress.218
Part of the federalists' reassurance was based on the widely-
accepted view that governmental violations of public trust were ultra
vires.2 19 Before the Virginia convention met, Harry Innes, the attorney
general for the District of Kentucky, maintained that Congress had no
more right to disadvantage some citizens for the benefit of others by ced-
ing navigation of the Mississippi than it had to close the Chesapeake. 220
At the Virginia convention, Governor Edmund Randolph followed the
same line of reasoning in defending the Constitution:
[t]o make a treaty to alienate any part of the United States, will
amount to a declaration of war against the inhabitants of the alienated
part, and a general absolution from allegiance. They will never
abandon this great ight.... The gentleman wishes us to show him a
clause which shall preclude Congress from giving away this right. It
216. 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 115. See also 4 id. at 118. Governor Samuel
Johnston, a federalist, responded that this was unlikely given that both the President and two-
thirds of the senators would need to concur in the making of treaties. 4 id. at 115-16.
217. MCDONALD, supra note 2, at 169.
218. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 141 (Patrick Henry, stating at the Virginia rati-
fying convention, "While the consent of nine states is necessary to the cession of territory, you
are safe. If it be put in the power of a less number, you will most infallibly lose the Missis-
sippi."). See also 3 id. at 151-52 (same); 3 id. at 325-26 (same); 3 id. at 292-93 (William
Grayson, speaking at the same convention); 3 id. at 340 (James Monroe, speaking at the same
convention). James Madison strongly disputed this conclusion. See Letter from James Madi-
son to George Nicholas (May 17, 1787), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 804-
10.
219. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
220. Letter from Harry Innes to John Brown (Dec. 7, 1787), in 8 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 221-22 (see Innes' third and tenth items). Brown was a Virginia
state senator and delegate to Congress. 8 id. at 525.
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is first incumbent upon him to show where the right is given up.
There is a prohibition naturally resulting from the nature of things, it
being contradictory and repugnant to reason, and the law of nature
and nations, to yield the most valuable right of a community, for the
exclusive benefit of one particular part of it.2 2 1
It appears, therefore, that by the founding generation's understand-
ing of the Property Clause (and the rest of the Constitution), Congress
was required to dispose of lands not necessary for enumerated purposes.
It also appears that disposition was to occur in an impartial manner for
the common benefit. Lands could not simply be given away to states or
to any other favored parties. Betsy Johnson and the rest of her genera-
tion would have thought such a disposition neither "necessary" nor
"proper." 22 2
CONCLUSION
Considered from the vantage point of original meaning, both the
conservative and liberal interpretations of the "other Property" portion of
the Property Clause are partly correct. The liberals are correct in that the
Constitution-not just arguably, but clearly--authorizes permanent
property ownership outside the Enclave Clause. The clarity of this result
flows both from the text of the document and from comments made dur-
ing ratification. Moreover, the liberals are correct in suggesting that
those lands are subject to a public trust and cannot be ceded to the re-
spective states without compensation. Federal land disposal, like federal
land management, must serve the interest of the entire country.
221. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 362 (emphasis added). Randolph added:
But there is an expression which clearly precludes the general government
from ceding the navigation of this river. In the 2d clause of the 3d section of the 4th
article, Congress is empowered "to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regu-
lations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States."
But it goes on, and provides that "nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed
as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or any particular state." Is this a
claim of the particular state of Virginia? If it be, there is no authority in the Consti-
tution to prejudice it. If it be not, then we need not be told of it. This is a sufficient
limitation and restraint.
3 id. at 362-63. See also 3 id. at 505 (Edmund Randolph); 3 id. at 509 (Francis Corbin).
Randolph and his allies knew their Coke. See, e.g., The Case of Monopolies, 11 Coke
Rep. 84b, 86b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260, 1263 (1602) ("[E]very gift or grant from the King has this
condition, either expressly or tacitly annexed to it, Illa quod patria per donationem illiam
magis solito non oneretur seu gravetur, and every grant made in grievance or prejudice of the
subject is void .... ).
222. Natelson, Necessary and Proper, supra note 2 (forthcoming 2005).
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On the other hand, the conservatives are correct about another as-
pect of original meaning. As understood at the time of ratification, the
Constitution did not permit the federal government to retain and manage
land indefinitely for unenumerated purposes. Massive, permanent fed-
eral land ownership would have been seen as subversive of the constitu-
tional scheme. The federal government's authority to dispose was
unlimited (except for trust standards), but its authority to acquire, retain,
and manage was not: all the latter functions could be exercised only to
serve enumerated powers. To be sure, Congress would have consider-
able discretion as to how to effectuate enumerated powers, and reason-
able exercises of discretion were not to be questioned. At the end of the
day, however, all federal land not "necessary and proper" to execute an
enumerated power was to be disposed of impartially and for the public
good.
I should not be understood as saying that the framers and ratifiers
meant to require sale on the open market or to the highest bidder as the
only way of disposing land for the public good. That was the method
appropriate in 1788, perhaps; but they would have understood that in
later times the "proper" methods of disposition would vary according to
needs of the country and the nature of the land. 223 In future years, the
public interest might justify disposing of (on suitable terms) agricultural
lands to homesteaders, mining lands to miners, and environmentally sen-
sitive lands to other public entities or to nonprofit environmental trusts.
Generally, though, the Constitution's original meaning was that lands not
dedicated to enumerated functions were to be privatized or otherwise de-
volved on terms that best served the general interest.
POSTSCRIPT ON THE CAST OF CHARACTERS
Edmund Johnson, Betsy's husband, subsequently attended his
state's ratifying convention, where he took the floor twice to express
misgivings about the Constitution. After the convention voted to pro-
pose amendments, he followed Betsy's advice and voted for ratification.
He was thus one of those who supplied the federalists with a narrow
margin of victory in his state. Thereafter, he returned home and success-
223. Thus, Edmund Randolph, who as a member of the federal convention's "committee
of detail" produced the first sketch of the Constitution, laid it down as one of his axioms that
the constitution should include "essential principles only, lest the operations of government
should be clogged by rendering those provisions permanent and unalterable, which ought to be
accomodated [sic] to times and events." 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 137.
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fully urged his skeptical constituents to give the new government a fair
chance. He died in 1790, after a fall from a horse. He was thirty-nine
years old.
Betsy Johnson did not remarry. She continued to play an honored
role in her community. In later years, she served as an informal advisor
to several local political figures. Only two of her children survived her: a
daughter who wrote books and married a prosperous merchant, and her
eldest son, who joined the army and served with distinction in the
American West. Mrs. Johnson lived to see the new century, finally suc-
cumbing to pneumonia in 1810, after a life of the then-respectable length
of fifty-six years.
Casey Emerson is very much alive-a vigorous seventy-nine year
old who works hard and remains determined to find a way to force the
"feds" to transfer Montana public lands to the state government; and, if
possible, to induce the federal government to pay Montana 116 years'
back rent.
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